In mid-August 2021, Taliban militants swept into Kabul, completing their takeover of Afghanistan and marking a new phase in what has been the world’s most lethal conflict in recent years. The U.S.-backed government in place since 2001 is gone, as are almost all U.S. and NATO troops. As the new dispensation takes shape, Crisis Group remains focused on promoting a deep understanding of events on the ground and helping the various stakeholders inside and outside the country comprehend their counterparts' motives and political constraints. We also aim to advance policies that improve security and promote inclusive governance.
A mass-casualty incident near Kabul on 16 March marks a significant escalation in hostilities between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. More fighting promises nothing but more death, displacement and economic damage. Friendly countries should work together to bring the sides back to the negotiating table.
The October 2025 ceasefire with Pakistan collapsed after Islamabad launched airstrikes in response to deadly militant attacks; major cross-border hostilities killed scores and raised the prospect of a spiralling conflict.
Lethal militants attacks continued at high intensity in Pakistan. Notably, Islamic State suicide bombing 6 Feb killed 38 worshippers and injured around 170 at Shia mosque in Pakistani capital Islamabad; Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi alleged “mastermind” was Afghan national trained in Afghanistan. Tensions with Kabul grew further as militants killed security personnel across Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province over subsequent days. In further escalation, Pakistani Taliban (TTP) suicide car bombing 16 Feb killed 11 soldiers and child at checkpoint in Pakistan’s Bajaur district, and TTP suicide attack on military convoy 21 Feb killed lieutenant colonel and soldier in Bannu district; authorities claimed attacker of latter strike had been member of Afghan Taliban. Effectively collapsing ceasefire agreed in Oct 2025, Pakistan 21 Feb struck Afghanistan’s Paktika and Nangarhar provinces, alleging it had targeted TTP and Islamic State targets, claiming to have killed over 100 militants and accusing Kabul of failing to take substantive action against “anti-Pakistan terrorist groups”. Taliban countered that strikes hit civilian areas and “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children”. Kabul 22 Feb summoned Pakistani envoy to protest airstrikes, adding that “responsibility for any adverse consequences of such actions will rest with the opposing side”. UN’s mission in Afghanistan 23 Feb confirmed airstrikes killed at least 13 civilians. Taliban forces 26 Feb launched attacks along Afghanistan-Pakistan border in Paktia, Khost, Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunar provinces, claiming dozens of Pakistani military installations were captured and dozens of Pakistani security personnel killed. Pakistan responded with ground operations followed by air attacks on military installations in Kabul and Kandahar cities as well as Paktia province. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “an open war”. Pakistan claimed it killed hundreds of Taliban fighters, while Taliban claimed it killed dozens of Pakistani soldiers. Taliban 27 Feb stated openness to dialogue, but Pakistan next day asserted “There won’t be any talks”; without de-escalation, tit-for-tat attacks could spiral into major conflict (see Pakistan).
Without a cease-fire [between Afghanistan and Pakistan], the situation risks escalating further, with civilians likely to bear the brunt.
The sharp decline in humanitarian funding [to Afghanistan] seems likely to worsen under a Trump presidency.
The more isolated the Taliban becomes, the more they turn to China to replace the diplomatic weight the US previously provided.
Most regional capitals are not allowing the issue of non-recognition [of the Taliban] to hinder their relations with Kabul.
As Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban severed, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also gotten cold feet in their engagement [with the Taliban].
The flood of outrage from the West will strengthen the resolve of the Taliban leadership [in Afghanistan], which defines itself as a bulwark against the outside world.
The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran is entering its third week, with no end yet in sight. Crisis Group experts offer a 360-degree view of its effects on peace, security and economic stability around the world.
After the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 2021, they severely curtailed women’s rights. The private sector, in particular small-scale entrepreneurship, has emerged as one of the last spaces where women can attempt to cobble together a living, albeit with significant challenges.
A fresh outbreak of hostilities between Islamabad and Kabul follows a rash of lethal jihadist attacks in western Pakistan. The Pakistani government says the Afghan Taliban are harbouring the militants. With outside powers’ help, both capitals should work to reduce tensions before they escalate further.
Despite the myriad harsh controls the Taliban have imposed on their lives, a growing number of Afghan women are seeking ways to earn a living. To boost the economy, the authorities should relax rules that hinder women’s entrepreneurship. Donors can also assist these women’s ventures.
This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard speaks with Crisis Group experts Ibraheem Bahiss and Samina Ahmed about the recent clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces, Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan, the surge in militant violence in Pakistan and hopes for de-escalation.
Since the Afghan Taliban retook power in 2021, the West has employed economic coercion to try inducing change in the regime’s policies. Now donors are slashing humanitarian assistance, which could push millions into penury and increase the risks of instability. A new approach is needed.
The Islamic State-Khorasan Province based in Afghanistan seems to be losing steam, staging fewer deadly attacks. But it remains dangerous. More robust law enforcement cooperation will be vital to keep containing this group and any other ISIS branch that may seek to replace it.
Crisis Group expert Ibraheem Bahiss analyses the reasons behind Moscow’s move and what it could portend for the Taliban’s future diplomatic ties
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