Regional governments sought to clamp down on illegal mining, while satellite data showed deforestation in Brazil had slowed overall but is increasingly concentrated near protected areas.

Operations to combat illegal mining continued in several countries. In Brazil, police 12 Feb launched “Operation Yacumama”, targeting illegal gold extraction along Amazon River near Manaus city; operation, which involved several govt bodies, seized five boats including dredge. In Colombia, navy early Feb destroyed nine illegal dredges used by FARC dissident group Carolina Ramírez Front in Caquetá and Putumayo departments; police and army also carried out anti-river mining operations in Guainía department. Ecuador 2 Feb suspended all mining operations in Napo province and restricted processing in El Oro and Loja provinces, citing environmental consequences of illegal mining; over 90% of mines in Napo operate illegally, often controlled by outfits linked to Los Lobos and Los Choneros criminal groups. Investigative outlet Amazon Underworld 12 Feb reported that Colombian and Ecuadorian criminal groups involved in gold mining and drug trafficking have consolidated power in Ecuador’s Amazon as govt prioritises hotspots along coast.

Rate of deforestation in Brazil slowed overall but intensified in some areas. Brazil’s space agency early Feb released satellite data showing rate of deforestation continued to slow in early 2026. Data, however, highlighted that deforestation is increasingly concentrated near protected areas, including Indigenous territories. In Colombia, meanwhile, local media reported that in absentia trial of FARC dissident group EMC’s leader, Iván Mordisco, who is accused of deforestation in protected areas in Meta and Guaviare departments, will start 10 March.

In another important development. Gunmen in Colombia 16 Feb killed Albino Cañas Ramírez, Indigenous leader and defender of Indigenous reserves, in Caldas department, spotlighting continued targeting of environmental activists.

Authorities continued to take legal action against opposition figures in the wake of the December 2025 coup attempt; sporadic violence persisted in the northern departments.

Legal proceedings against opposition figures continued. Main opposition party Les Démocrates (LD) again denied any involvement in Dec 2025 coup attempt after security forces late Jan detained party VP Alassani Tigri – who is related to suspected plot leader Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri – on charges of “plotting against state authority”. Legal proceedings against opposition figures could heighten political tensions ahead of April 2026 presidential election, from which LD has been barred, leaving President Talon’s preferred successor, Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, without serious challenger. Meanwhile, police 27 Feb issued wanted notice for Pascal Tigri and eight other individuals as manhunt continued.

Violence persisted in northern departments. In Alibori department, unidentified assailants 7, 17 Feb attacked police stations in Gogounou and Karimama communes, respectively. In Atakora department, unidentified armed men 9 Feb clashed with security forces and 18 Feb reportedly targeted construction equipment in Kérou commune. Casualties and perpetrators unclear, though Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has previously been active in area. Following large-scale armed group attacks in western Nigeria, local media 18 Feb reported displacement of civilians into eastern Benin (see Nigeria).

In another important development. With Benin-Niger border still closed, Nigeria 9 Feb announced reopening of Tsamiya-Kamba corridor – shut since 2019 – allowing goods to transit from port of Cotonou to landlocked Niger; route from port of Lomé (Togo) to Niger via Burkina Faso is reportedly too insecure to be used for sensitive shipments. 

Jihadist combatants launched a series of large-scale, coordinated attacks across the country’s north and east; authorities formally dissolved political parties.

JNIM launched spate of attacks across broad swathes of territory. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) 14 Feb attacked Soudougui (Centre-Est region), Tandiari (Est region), Tangaye, and Titao towns (both Nord region) in coordinated campaign likely aimed at straining govt’s military resources and capacity to respond. Notably, hundreds of militants reportedly temporarily seized Titao military camp and town, killing dozens including seven Ghanaian nationals before troops and their civilian auxiliaries (VDPs) forced them to flee north. In Tandiari, near city of Fada N’Gourma, JNIM reportedly killed between 60 and 70 soldiers and seized unspecified military equipment. Earlier in month, JNIM 4 Feb claimed to have taken VDP position in Rambo town, Nord region, and targeted military convoy with improvised explosive devices near city of Djibo, Sahel region. JNIM 12 Feb also temporarily occupied Bilanga town, Est region, killing at least ten soldiers and reportedly capturing vehicles, weapons and ammunition.

JNIM continued to clash with Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel). IS-Sahel militants 9-10 Feb allegedly killed 41 JNIM militants in Djika, Belhout and Adoudji villages, Sahel region, capturing rifles and motorcycles; clashes have increased since IS-Sahel expanded operations in country’s north east in early Nov 2025. Separately, JNIM commander known by nom-de-guerre “Saad” early Feb defected to IS-Sahel, in what reportedly amounted to highest-ranking defection from JNIM to IS-Sahel in years.

Authorities dissolved political parties, continued crackdown amid fears of coup. Transitional Legislative Assembly 9 Feb unanimously approved bill dissolving political parties. Bill repeals statutes governing political parties (which had been suspended since 2022 coup) and political opposition, along with laws regulating elections. Transitional President Capt. Traoré continued to crack down on associates of former transitional President Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba, who was extradited from Togo in Jan over allegations of coup attempt. Former PM under Damiba, Albert Ouédraogo, has been missing since 30 Jan, while uncorroborated reports suggested that other political figures associated with Damiba were arrested in recent weeks.

The military stepped up efforts to prevent defections following recent battlefield setbacks in eastern DR Congo (DRC), while a vital border crossing reopened despite a persistent risk of rebel incursions into Burundi.

Army took steps to curb desertions, Burundi-DRC border crossing reopened. Army chief of staff instructed soldiers holding ordinary passports to surrender them by 10 Feb in effort to curb defections, which have reached alarming rate since Burundian troops suffered setbacks in clashes with Rwandan troops and their M23 allies around Congolese border town of Uvira in late 2025; army leadership 15 Feb also ordered full census of army personnel. Govt in Feb continued sending military reinforcements into DRC, with contingents active in Fizi territory (South Kivu province) and Tanganyika province. Meanwhile, Kavimvira/Gatumba border crossing on Lake Tanganyika 23 Feb reopened after more than two-month closure as Congolese authorities reasserted control over border area, though security along Rusizi corridor remains fragile (see DR Congo). Three weeks earlier, FM Edouard Bizimana had conditioned reopening on effective stabilisation of border area, alleging M23 rebels were cooperating with Burundian rebel group RED-Tabara to stage cross-border attacks into Burundi.

Humanitarian situation of Congolese refugees in Burundi remained alarming. By early Feb, cholera outbreak in Busuma refugee camp had been largely contained, but malnutrition, infectious diseases, and inadequate shelter continued to pose grave risks to Congolese refugees living there. World Food Programme early Feb warned continued assistance to nearly 90,000 refugees in Burundi would depend on additional funding. Meanwhile, police and ruling party CNDD-FDD youth wing Imbonerakure in Feb reportedly continued to detain refugees attempting to leave camps.

In another important development. President Ndayishimiye 14 Feb assumed rotating chairmanship of African Union (AU) for 2026, raising Burundi’s international profile.

President Biya postponed the legislative and municipal elections and government formation faced further delays, highlighting his waning authority over the ruling elite; insecurity and judicial developments kept the Anglophone conflict in focus.

Elite rivalries further delayed govt formation, Biya postponed elections. Despite renewed pledge on 11 Feb to appoint cabinet within days, President Biya by late Feb had not yet reshuffled govt following his contested Oct 2025 re-election. Delay reflects wrangling between powerful aides seeking to protect their positions and turf wars among senior ruling elites, as seen in scanning contract dispute at Douala Port. Meanwhile, Biya 10 Feb said parliamentary and municipal elections, which were expected to be held between March and May, would be further postponed; move comes amid funding shortfalls, dissatisfaction within president’s party even in its strongholds, and lingering tensions following boycott call by Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who claims to be president-elect.

Opposition continued to contest Biya’s re-election. Tchiroma, who lives in exile in The Gambia, 27 Feb urged diaspora citizens to mobilise in support of political transition toward “new Cameroon”. As Vatican confirmed that Pope Leo XIV will visit Cameroon from 15 to 18 April, some Tchiroma supporters and Jesuit priests accused Church of endorsing Biya’s contested re-election and remaining silent on repression of dissent.

Insecurity persisted in Anglophone regions. Separatist armed groups imposed three-day “ghost town” significantly curtailing movement in areas of North West and South West regions around 11 Feb National Youth Day – also marking 1961 plebiscite that resulted in Southern Cameroons joining Francophone Cameroon. In rare move, Yaoundé military court 19 Feb handed three soldiers five-to-ten-year prison sentences over 2020 killing of 21 civilians in Ngarbuh village (North West); victims and human rights bodies criticised penalties as too lenient.

Jihadist attacks continued in Far North region. In Logone-et-Chari division, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 18 Feb attacked Bargaram military post, killing one soldier; soldiers 26 Feb repelled another attack on Bargaram, killing six suspected ISWAP combatants. Rival Boko Haram faction known as JAS mid-Feb killed several civilians and abducted at least 19 in Blangoua and Darak towns (also Logone-et-Chari). 

President Touadéra continued to consolidate power after his disputed re-election, while the ethnic Azandé militia deepened its shift from government ally to armed challenger with a fresh attack on the military.

Political pluralism further constrained in aftermath of elections. President Touadéra continued consultations aimed at forming new govt following his late-Dec re-election. Authorities showed no willingness to open dialogue with political parties that boycotted elections, instead looking for avenues to further reinforce political exclusion of opposition. Notably, some ruling party members are reportedly advocating for dissolution of parties not represented in National Assembly, citing provisions of law governing political parties adopted in 2004.

Violent incidents persisted in eastern and north-western areas. Ethnic Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) militiamen 3 Feb attacked national army position in Dembia village (Mbomou prefecture), capturing four soldiers, who remained missing by month’s end. Continued confrontation with AAKG illustrates how state reliance on militias can backfire, with former allies turning into autonomous armed challengers. Meanwhile, Defence Ministry said national army, backed by Russian allies, 4 Feb conducted operation against unspecified armed group in Haute-Kotto prefecture, near South Sudanese border; offensive reportedly resulted in death of 20 people and arrest of 32 others, while prompting 300 illegal miners to return to South Sudan. End of transhumance period fuelled insecurity in north west. Two incidents of cattle-related violence 31 Jan-2 Feb left two people dead and five injured near Bocaranga town (Ouham-Pendé prefecture).

Authorities pursued diversification of security partnerships. Army chief of staff 3-8 Feb visited Uganda to discuss military cooperation opportunities, including training and operational capacity building. U.S. Africa Command delegation 3 Feb visited Bangui to explore ways to support strengthening of army capacity, illustrating U.S. President Donald Trump administration’s efforts to re-engage African states. Meanwhile, after Bangui reportedly accepted replacement of Russian paramilitary Wagner Group by Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps under pressure from Moscow, implementation of transition dragged on; upcoming change could see partial retention in CAR of Wagner personnel, who would be integrated into Africa Corps.

The government closed the border with Sudan after the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) once again launched a cross-border attack into Chad; the escalating spillover indicates that some Chadian army officers are increasingly acting outside formal command structures to support anti-RSF groups in Darfur.

Chad shut border with Sudan in bid to contain spillover of violence. Govt 23 Feb said it had closed its border with Sudan “until further notice” to prevent “repeated incursions” by Sudanese fighters. Decision came after paramilitary RSF 21 Feb reportedly crossed into Chad amid heavy fighting with Sudanese army in Sudan’s Darfur region (see Sudan), and attacked army outpost in Chadian border town of Tine, leaving at least six soldiers dead and over 20 people injured, mostly civilians. Similar incident in same area in Jan had left seven Chadian soldiers dead. Attacks in Chad – apparently in retaliation for support some ethnic Zaghawa generals have provided to local Zaghawa groups fighting RSF in Darfur – are increasing pressure on President Déby to cease support to RSF. Border remained open, however, to Sudanese refugees and humanitarian aid.

Insecurity persisted in both rural and urban areas. Armed men 17 Feb ambushed commercial vehicle between Faya-Largeau and Kouba Olanga towns (Borkou province), killing driver and stealing valuables. Latter’s family next day allegedly pursued assailants, prompting security forces to intervene; clashes killed four security personnel and two assailants, while two others were captured and later killed by victim’s relatives. Earlier, land dispute 1 Feb escalated into violence at home of Chari-Baguirmi province traditional chief in capital N’Djamena, leaving two dead and one injured.

Teachers continued strike amid govt pressure. Chadian Teachers’ Union (SET) 16 Feb started two-week strike demanding better working conditions; tensions ran high as govt said unworked days would not be paid. Earlier, court 2 Feb sentenced Faustin Djimoudouel, leader of another teachers’ union known as Independent Teachers’ Union of Chad (SIET), to one year in prison on charges of rebellion and disturbing public order after SIET in Jan launched similar two-week strike. Authorities’ coercive response reflects broader authoritarian repression of social demands.

Authorities summoned the Nigerien Ambassador, while border cooperation with Burkina Faso deteriorated, after Niamey and Ouagadougou accused Côte d’Ivoire of sponsoring destabilisation attempts on their territories.

Ivorian govt 4 Feb announced having summoned Nigerien ambassador on 30 Jan to “express strong protest” after Niger’s President Gen. Abdourahamane Tiani accused President Ouattara – alongside French and Beninese leaders – of sponsoring late-Jan Islamic State attack on capital Niamey’s international airport and adjacent Air Base 101. While Alliance of Sahel States countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – have previously accused Côte d’Ivoire of destabilisation attempts, Ivorian govt official said it was first time Ouattara had been personally incriminated. Meanwhile, Burkinabè and Ivorian gendarmerie units deployed along shared border allegedly ceased all communication after Ouagadougou in Jan accused Abidjan of sponsoring attempted plot to topple Burkinabè president, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré. Member of Mali’s interim legislative body, Mamadou Hawa Gassama, was released from prison after Ouattara 10 Feb reportedly granted him presidential pardon; court in Abidjan had in Jan sentenced Gassama to three years’ imprisonment for insulting Ouattara, but Malian authorities responded with restraint amid renewed dependence on Ivorian fuel imports. 
 

As Congolese troops and aligned militias continued fighting Rwandan forces and their M23 allies in the Kivu provinces, the growing use of drones heightened the risk of the conflict spreading to other regions of the country in the coming weeks or months.

M23 conflict continued, threatened to expand beyond Kivu provinces. Pro-govt forces, notably Wazalendo militiamen, in Feb continued to combat Rwandan and M23 forces and allies, including local Twirwaneho militia, in Kivu provinces. In South Kivu, fighting raged in Minembwe highlands (Fizi territory) for control of Point Zéro village, which commands access to lowlands toward Tanganyika province. Notably, Congolese army 19-20 Feb carried out drone strikes in area, leading Twirwaneho to retreat from several positions. Authorities 23 Feb reopened key Kavimvira/Gatumba border crossing with Burundi (see Burundi). In North Kivu, army in Feb conducted airstrikes on M23 positions along Provincial Road 1030 in Walikale territory. In Masisi territory, pro-govt forces 23-25 Feb launched offensive near mining town of Rubaya, including drone strikes that killed M23’s spokesperson, Willy Ngoma, taking control of multiple locations; in counter-attack, M23 and allies 25-26 Feb reportedly recaptured several villages, including strategic Kasenyi. Meanwhile, M23 claimed destroying drone command centre in 31 Jan-1 Feb drone attack on Kisangani airport, Tshopo province, while Kinshasa said attack had been repelled. Drone strikes 1 March again targeted Kisangani airport (await next month’s edition for more).

Kinshasa advanced minerals diplomacy amid fragmented peace initiatives. President Tshisekedi visited several countries, including United Arab Emirates on 2 Feb, in effort to leverage DRC’s mineral wealth to secure diplomatic and security support. Critics accused govt of underselling vast national resources, notably with Dec 2025 Strategic Partnership Agreement with U.S. Regional diplomacy saw limited progress: Angolan President João Lourenço 11 Feb proposed ceasefire to take effect 18 Feb; Kinshasa welcomed move, while M23 rejected Luanda track but reiterated commitment to ceasefire under Doha process.

Other armed group violence continued in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. Congolese and Ugandan forces stepped up joint operations against Islamic State-linked Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in North Kivu and Ituri provinces (see Uganda). But ADF attack 7 Feb killed at least 20 people in Mambimbi-Isigo village, Lubero territory, North Kivu. 

The build-up of Ethiopian, Tigrayan and Eritrean forces in northern Ethiopia fuelled tensions and fanned fears of renewed armed conflict.

Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions surged. Ethiopia’s FM Gedion Timothewos 7 Feb wrote to FM Osman Saleh accusing Eritrea of stationing troops inside Ethiopia’s Tigray region and supporting Ethiopian opposition groups – seemingly referring to Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), among others. Asmara rejected allegations and insisted that its troops remain within internationally recognised borders. Media company Bloomberg 19 Feb reported that both Ethiopia and Eritrea are deploying military assets to Tigray, while Tigray Defence Forces (armed wing of TPLF) also stationed troops in strategic areas. Massing of forces on multiple sides fanned fears of conflict pitting federal govt against TPLF and/or Eritrea (see Ethiopia).

Riyadh stepped up diplomatic efforts in bid to stave off conflict. Top Saudi officials travelled to Eritrea and Ethiopia in Feb in bid to stave off war, which Riyadh fears would fuel regional instability and open new opportunities for its rival, United Arab Emirates, to assert its agenda in Horn of Africa, Riyadh’s backyard.

The massing of forces by federal authorities, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrea in northern Ethiopia fanned fears of a return to armed conflict; insurgent activity escalated in Amhara and Oromia regions.

Federal, Tigrayan and Eritrean troop build-ups fuelled fears of conflict in Tigray. Following Jan flare-up between federal troops (ENDF) and armed wing of TPLF (TDF), clashes early Feb continued between TDF and federal-backed insurgents in Southern Tigray Zone. Federal-Tigray tensions escalated further amid reports of major ENDF mobilisation along Tigray’s boundaries, while TDF stationed troops in mountainous areas of Central Tigray Zone and along boundary between TPLF-controlled territory and contested areas of Tigray (administered by Amhara with federal backing). Media company Bloomberg 19 Feb reported that Eritrea (which backs TPLF) is also deploying additional forces to border areas with Tigray. Massing of forces fanned fears of conflict pitting federal govt against TPLF and/or Eritrea (see Eritrea). Adding to federal-Tigray frictions, National Election Board of Ethiopia 23 Feb announced that districts contested between Tigray and Amhara would not participate in Tigray regional council elections, limiting residents to federal parliamentary voting in June; Federal High Court 26 Feb suspended decision pending legal review.

Insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia escalated. Insurgent violence intensified in zones across Amhara and Oromia amid redeployment of ENDF units further north. Notably, Fano fighters 11 Feb briefly entered Amhara’s Debre Tabor city, South Gondar Zone, burning police stations and administrative offices, and triggering retaliatory drone strikes, while govt forces 19 Feb clashed with Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia’s North Shewa Zone.

Media report suggested that Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan war is growing. News agency Reuters 10 Feb reported that Ethiopia is hosting training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), financed by United Arab Emirates, in first reported direct evidence of Addis Ababa’s involvement in conflict. Sudanese army also accused Ethiopia of sending RSF troops to Sudan via South Sudan for offensives in Blue Nile state (see Sudan).

In important international developments. Top Turkish, Saudi and Israeli officials travelled to Ethiopia in Feb as strategic competition in Horn intensifies. Turkish and Saudi visits focused on bilateral relations and degenerating regional situation, which left unchecked could envelop Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan.

The transfer of an infamous inmate convicted over the 2009 Conakry stadium massacre sparked brief gunfire in the capital; Guinea arrested Sierra Leonean army and police officers in the latest flare-up of a long-running border dispute.

Shooting near capital’s central prison caused panic. Gunfire 10 Feb erupted near capital Conakry’s central prison, sparking brief panic in downtown Kaloum neighbourhood. Gunshots reportedly happened during transfer of Aboubacar Sidiki “Toumba” Diakité – who was sentenced in 2024 to ten years in prison for involvement, in his capacity as aide-de-camp to then-President Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara, in 2009 Conakry stadium massacre – from Kaloum prison, located near presidential palace in Conakry, to Coyah facility, about 50km away. Govt said Special Forces were moving Diakité to “preserve public order and ensure security” after he resisted cell search that uncovered bladed weapons. Episode stoked fears of coup attempt, four years after putsch that brought Gen. Mamady Doumbouya to power.

Authorities detained Sierra Leonean security personnel in border incident. Guinean army 24 Feb announced having arrested 16 Sierra Leonean soldiers and police officers overnight 22-23 Feb, accusing them of crossing border without authorisation and raising their flag 1.4km inside Guinean territory. Freetown same day said its troops were constructing new border post in Kalieyereh town (Falaba district), within internationally recognised Sierra Leonean territory, and 27 Feb said all personnel had been released after FM Timothy Kabba met with Guinean PM Amadou Oury Bah in Conakry; two countries reportedly also agreed to set up commission to examine issue and prevent new incidents. Episode marked first flare-up of two-decade border dispute since mid-2025 (see Sierra Leone). 

Military rulers pledged an inclusive transition in line with the West Africa regional bloc’s demands, but legal proceedings continued against the opposition.

In letter to West African regional bloc ECOWAS, transitional President Maj. Gen. Horta Inta-A late Jan announced plans to form “inclusive” transitional govt that would allocate several ministerial portfolios to opposition African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and Party for Social Renewal; parties swiftly rejected offer, saying it was insufficient to have real political weight and address broader crisis. Military tribunal 9 Feb summoned PAIGC leader, former PM Domingos Simões Pereira, over alleged involvement in coup attempts in late 2023 and Oct 2025; Pereira, who was arrested during Nov 2025 coup that toppled President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, was released from prison and placed under house arrest in Jan without formal charges.

Political violence left at least two dead as competition intensified ahead of the high-stakes 2027 elections; authorities announced having thwarted a suspected Al-Shabaab plot to carry out an attack in the capital, Nairobi.

Tensions over main opposition party’s alliance with President Ruto turned violent. Govt and central leadership of late Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) resorted to brutal tactics to keep ODM splinter group, which includes Nairobi Senator Edwin Sifuna, Siaya Governor James Orengo and Embakasi East MP Babu Owino, from gaining traction. Disagreements within ODM relate to party’s alliance with President Ruto for 2027 general elections. Police 15 Feb used teargas to disperse rally organised by Sifuna, who also serves as ODM secretary general, in Kitengela town near capital Nairobi; ensuing chaos left one person dead. Both police and unidentified armed men 21 Feb confronted supporters of ODM splinter group at rally in Kakamega town, Vihiga county, leaving several injured; violence same day also erupted in nearby Mbale town, leaving one dead, while Sifuna and Owino reported “state-sponsored goons” attacked them upon their arrival at Kisumu airport in bid to hinder their travels to Kakamega. Meanwhile, police 23 Feb arrested Communist Party Marxist-Kenya (CPM-K) Sec-Gen Booker Ngesa Omole in Isiolo county; CPM-K condemned move as brutal kidnapping; court 26 Feb denied him bail.

Al-Shabaab continued to pose threat in north-eastern counties and beyond. Police mid-Feb said months-long surveillance operation in vicinity of Dadaab refugee camp (Garissa County) had resulted in seizure of arms and ammunition which may have been intended for use by Al-Shabaab in Nairobi, suggesting group poses continued threat beyond its north-eastern strongholds bordering Somalia. Meanwhile, President Ruto 12 Feb said two border crossings with Somalia will reopen in April after 15-year closure due to Al-Shabaab activity, citing need to boost trade and reunite families.

In other important developments. Drought conditions worsened quickly following near total failure of Oct-Dec 2025 short rains; govt reported 2.5mn people at risk of severe hunger and water scarcity, with cattle-keeping communities in north east hardest hit. 

President Gen. Goïta rewarded key military figures in a government reshuffle, while jihadist and separatist violence persisted in the country’s centre and north.

Goïta reshuffled govt, consolidating small circle around him. President Gen. Goïta 12 Feb carried out govt reshuffle, promoting three heavyweights to rank of state ministers – Defence Minister Gen. Sadio Camara, Reconciliation Minister Gen. Ismaël Wagué, who are among five officers who led 2020 coup, and Finance Minister Alhousseini Sanou. PM Maj. Gen. Abdoulaye Maïga lost territorial administration portfolio – a sovereign ministry – to another general, Issa Ousmane Coulibaly. Moves reinforced Camara’s influence, widely seen as diminished after JNIM imposed fuel blockade on Bamako in Sept 2025, while significantly undermining Maïga’s position.

Jihadist and separatist attacks continued in centre and north. In centre, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) 4 Feb conducted attack involving unprecedented use of kamikaze drones in Kendié village (Bandiagara region), killing five Dozo hunters. Attack underlined community militia’s vulnerability as jihadists’ primary target in area, particularly after military reportedly vacated some positions in Bandiagara in recent months as part of tacit non-aggression pact with jihadists. In response, Dozo leader Youssouf Toloba has stepped up calls for support, expressing concern about Dozos’ growing isolation in fight against jihadists. In north, separatist coalition Azawad Liberation Front 18 Feb reportedly carried out drone strike against joint army and allied Russian Africa Corps convoy between Anefis and Aguelhoc towns, Kidal region; JNIM attacked same convoy with explosives.

Truck drivers’ union launched strike to protest insecurity amid attacks on fuel convoys in west. Main truck drivers’ union, Synacor, 9 Feb stopped work, demanding repatriation of colleagues’ remains following 29 Jan JNIM attack on fuel convoy that killed between 12 and 18 drivers on Diboli-Kayes axis.

In another important development. At peace conference in Mauritania, influential religious figure, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, 12 Feb reiterated call for national dialogue; authorities did not respond. Dicko, who has lived in exile in Algeria since 2023, is positioning himself as indispensable mediator at sub-regional level.

Islamic State militants stepped up attacks in the northern Cabo Delgado province as the rainy season eased; security forces detained several members of opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane’s party.

Insurgents targeted security forces and civilians, continued resupply efforts. As rains eased, Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) 31 Jan-1 Feb launched attacks on two security posts in Catupa forest, prompting security forces to abandon positions; group claimed to have killed nine soldiers. Fighting 6-9 Feb reportedly resumed as security forces attempted to retake posts, killing some five insurgents but failing to dislodge them. In another significant incident, insurgents 22 Feb reportedly killed two civilians during attack on vehicles travelling under military escort along key N380 road near Quinto Congresso village, Macomia district; reports suggested militants were looking for money and food. Security forces responded and clashes reportedly continued over several days involving Mozambican, Rwandan troops and Força Local (group of militias close to ruling party Frelimo and partly integrated in army); unconfirmed reports said several Rwandan soldiers among those killed. Rwandan army chief of staff 26 Feb visited Cabo Delgado, reaffirming commitment to supporting govt against ISMP. Meanwhile, insurgents 5 Feb kidnapped three minors in Mumo village, Mocímboa da Praia district; UN children’s agency (UNICEF) 12 Feb expressed “deep concern” about spate of abductions and recruitment of children in Cabo Delgado. ISMP resupplying efforts in Feb focused on coastal areas of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts.

Police detained opposition supporters, divisions continued to plague RENAMO. Police in Maputo province 19 Feb reportedly arrested eight members of opposition party National Alliance for Free and Autonomous Mozambique (ANAMOLA) on accusations of disturbing public order, allegedly torturing them in detention. ANAMOLA leader Venâncio Mondlane 22 Feb denounced “organised campaign of political harassment” against party and its supporters; all eight party supporters released same day. Meanwhile, former RENAMO guerrillas 17 Feb launched national campaign to call for extraordinary party congress to remove party leader Ossufo Momade over mismanagement allegations; Momade, who has faced mounting resignation calls including from senior party members in recent weeks, 21 Feb condemned “ill-intentioned” people looking to “fragment” RENAMO.

Security conditions continued to deteriorate as jihadist groups expanded operations in several regions; authorities pursued rapprochement with Algeria.

Jihadist groups continued to expand operations in multiple areas. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) 8 Feb claimed its first attack in Tahoua region (centre west), killing five soldiers in ambush on army patrol near Birnin Konni town along Nigeria border. In Tillabéry region (south west), IS-Sahel 2 Feb launched coordinated attacks on Ayorou security post, Banibangou commune and Massamey village, reportedly killing three national guard members, eight pro-govt militiamen and seizing vehicles and materiel. Also in Tillabéry, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) 4 Feb attacked military position in Makalondi commune near Burkina Faso, claimed dozens of soldiers killed, while ambush on self-defence militia 26 Feb reportedly killed 25 in Anzourou area. In neighbouring Dosso region, JNIM 6 Feb attacked customs office in Kouré commune, while IS-Sahel 14 Feb targeted gendarmerie post in Guéchémé commune.

Armed group continued to target energy infrastructure in south east. In Diffa region, Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice (MPLJ), which opposes military rule and fights for release of deposed President Bazoum, 10 Feb again attacked oil pipeline at Djibeilla site in Agadem area; authorities reported assailants were repelled, while MPLJ claimed to have inflicted significant damage.

Niger and Algeria restored diplomatic relations. Niamey and Algiers returned their respective ambassadors after ten-month hiatus as President Gen. Tiani and his counterpart, President Tebboune, mid-Feb met in Algiers (see Algeria). Rapprochement could serve as springboard for thaw between Algeria and Mali, another Alliance of Sahel States member, or drive a wedge between Niger and Mali, if Bamako is unwilling to reconcile with Algiers.

In other important developments. Moscow 2 Feb confirmed that Africa Corps personnel late Jan participated in defence of Air Base 101 in capital Niamey during IS-Sahel assault. Authorities 4 Feb threatened proceedings against French nuclear firm Orano over alleged environmental damage linked to uranium extraction at Somaïr mine near Arlit town. Tiani 13 Feb indicated readiness to return share of uranium refined prior to nationalisation of Somaïr mine in June 2025, signalling limited openness to easing tensions with Paris amid ongoing arbitration dispute.

Jihadist attacks escalated in the western axis of the North Central Zone, leaving over 200 civilians killed and confirming the expansion of violence beyond the north-eastern and north-western hotspots.

Jihadists launched unprecedented attacks in North Central. In Kwara state, armed group 3 Feb killed over 160 people in Woro village, Kaiama area, marking one of deadliest attacks in recent years. Assault was allegedly carried out by Boko Haram faction led by Mallam Abubakar Saidu Sadiku. In Niger state, suspected Boko Haram combatants 14, 28 Feb raided several villages in Borgu area near Benin, killing at least 71 while abducting others. Incidents underscore expansion of jihadist violence into North Central Zone and growing strength of jihadist groups in and around Kainji National Park, increasing risk of violence spreading further southward. Suspected herder-farmer violence 3, 20-26 Feb killed at least 38 people in Benue and Plateau states.

Armed group attacks continued in North West. In Katsina state, criminal group 3 Feb killed at least 20 people in Doma village, Faskari area. In Zamfara state, armed group 19-20 Feb killed at least 50 people, abducted others in Anka and Bukkuyum areas. Security situation in Nigeria-Niger-Benin tri-border area continued to worsen. Notably, armed group 18 Feb killed at least 34 people in Arewa Dandi area, Kebbi state; local officials blamed attacks on Lakurawa armed group affiliated with jihadists operating in Mali and Niger.

Jihadist and other violence continued in North East. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 14, 16 and 21 Feb attacked army positions near Sambisa forest, in Kukawa area (both Borno state), and in Hong area (Adamawa state), respectively; both sides suffered casualties, with ISWAP losing senior commander on 14 Feb. Suspected Boko Haram fighters 24 Feb killed at least 25 civilians in Madagali and Hong areas (also Adamawa). Bauchi state govt said region was under siege by “over 10,000 armed bandits” after attack on military base in Alkaleri area 22 Feb killed two soldiers and one vigilante.

U.S. deployed soldiers to boost fight against jihadists. Three U.S. cargo planes 12-15 Feb arrived in north-eastern Bauchi area carrying about 100 troops and equipment; U.S. forces will support Nigerian military in training and advisory capacities. 

Cairo voiced support for the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)’s inclusivity push, while countries that ratified the Nile Basin framework agreement reaffirmed their commitment to equitable water use.

FM Badr Abdelatty 8 Feb spoke with his Kenyan counterpart, Musalia Mudavadi, welcoming consultation process initiated by NBI to restore “inclusivity”; Egypt and Sudan have long refused to engage with forum (which aims to brings together all riparian countries in multilateral format), since they consider it to be biased in Ethiopia’s favour. Abdelatty 16 Feb visited Kenyan capital Nairobi for talks with Mudavadi, along with two countries’ water ministers. In joint statement, both sides underlined their commitment to strengthen cooperation and dialogue over NBI’s consultation process. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry 13 Feb hosted meeting with FMs from countries that ratified Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (rejected by Egypt and Sudan), who reiterated their commitment to equitable Nile water use.

Mounting calls for sanctions in the U.S. and a shift in tone at the African Union (AU) summit increased pressure on Kigali to honour its diplomatic commitments and withdraw from eastern DR Congo (DRC).

Threat of U.S. sanctions increased pressure on Kigali. Media reported that President Kagame late Jan called U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham in a bid to head off potential U.S. sanctions on senior Rwandan army officials over role in ongoing fighting in eastern DRC conflict. Kagame 5 Feb urged greater national self-reliance in face of international “threats”, rejecting accusations that Rwanda seeks to capture Congolese territory or grab mineral resources; also reiterated govt’s primary concern remains security threats posed by anti-Kigali armed group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and what he described as “genocidal ideology”. U.S. 2 March imposed sanctions on Rwanda Defence Force and several top military officials, condemning “blatant violations of Washington Peace Accords” and calling for immediate troop withdrawal from DRC (await next month’s edition for more).

Tensions appeared to be rising between Kigali and AU. At 14-15 Feb AU summit in Addis Ababa – which Kagame did not attend, AU Commission chair, Djibouti’s Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, adopted firmer stance on Rwanda, while Burundi President Evariste Ndayishimiye – whose relations with Kigali remain tense – assumed AU rotating chairmanship. AU panel of peace facilitators for eastern DRC, led by Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé, 29 Jan-3 Feb toured region, holding consultations in Kigali, Kinshasa, Gitega and Kampala, as well as with Angolan President João Lourenço, who had renewed mediation push in Jan in his capacity as AU Chairperson. Rwandan FM Olivier Nduhungirehe 20 Feb said Burundi should not participate in AU-led mediation efforts, arguing that Gitega is directly involved in conflict in eastern DRC.

Guinea briefly detained Sierra Leonean security personnel in the latest flare-up of a long-running border dispute.

Govt 24 Feb said Guinean troops had crossed into border town of Kalieyereh, Falaba district, on 23 Feb and arrested several Sierra Leonean army and police officers who were building new border post and related facilities; govt said Sierra Leonean officers had raised national flag within territory recognised as Sierra Leonean, and affirmed commitment to “peaceful and amicable resolution” through diplomatic channels. Information ministry 27 Feb said FM Timothy Kabba had secured release of Sierra Leonean security officers after meeting with Guinean PM Amadou Oury Bah in Guinean capital Conakry. Episode marked first flare-up of two-decade border dispute since mid-2025 (see Guinea).

As long-awaited election talks concluded without agreement, the political stalemate fuelled violence in South West state; meanwhile, security forces intensified air and ground operations against Al-Shabaab.

Electoral talks concluded without agreement. Federal govt 19 Feb opened dialogue in Mogadishu with Somalia Future Council (comprising presidential candidates and federal member states of Puntland and Jubaland) to address disagreements over electoral model and constitutional review process. Talks marked first engagement in months, but concluded 23 Feb without agreement. Both sides blamed the other for failing to compromise, while keeping open option of future dialogue. With time running out to hold remaining district, state and federal polls by 15 May deadline, all sides privately acknowledged extension of govt’s mandate as likely; however, continued disagreement on path forward for elections makes inclusive, consensus-based extension increasingly elusive, raising prospect of unilateral extension by Mogadishu, which would carry significant risk of violence. Somalia Future Council 27 Feb announced it will convene summit on 10 April to coordinate next steps.

Electoral stalemate sparked violence in South West state. In Baidoa city (South West), fighting between state forces and militias aligned with opposition 4-5 Feb killed around 15. Govt forces regained control of city, but opposition-aligned fighters remained mobilised on its outskirts throughout Feb. Situation highlights tense environment in some federal member states, where elections are long overdue without clear path forward.

Security operations against Al-Shabaab intensified. Govt and security partners stepped up airstrikes targeting Al-Shabaab leadership deep in areas under its control. Notably, strikes in Qaahira area of Middle Shabelle (Hirshabelle state) and Sakow area of Middle Juba (Jubaland state) 3, 8 Feb reportedly killed several local Al-Shabaab leaders. Reports of civilian casualties during late-Jan strike in Maxa Saciid area (Middle Shabelle) sparked controversy. Army 22 Feb also launched operation targeting militants in Hawadley area of Middle Shabelle.

In other important developments. Somalia continued international outreach to roll back Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and redoubled efforts to deepen security arrangements amid mounting regional tensions. Notably, Mogadishu 9 Feb signed military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia (see Somaliland).

The fallout from Israel’s recognition of Somaliland continued to loom large as Mogadishu and Hargeisa sought rival alliances to buttress their position against the other; authorities failed to stem the tide of communal violence in Awdal region.

Somalia and Somaliland tried to outdo each other in international arena. Fallout from Israel’s recognition continued to merge with tensions related to widening Saudi-Emirati rift. Somaliland President Cirro 3 Feb travelled to United Arab Emirates for World Governments Summit, and mid-Feb announced that Somaliland was nearing cargo and trade agreement with Ethiopia. Cirro 6 Feb also floated possibility of allowing Israeli firm to operate port on its coast. Meanwhile, Somalia 9 Feb signed military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 8 Feb travelled to Cairo, where President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi affirmed Egypt’s support for Somalia’s unity, and 12 Feb attended session of AU Peace and Security Council that called for Israel to reverse its recognition of Somaliland. Meanwhile, media in late Feb-early March speculated that potential Israeli military presence at Berbera port could put Somaliland at risk of attacks by Iran and its allies (see Iran, Yemen).

Communal violence continued in Awdal region. Tit-for-tat clashes between Gadabursi and Isse communities continued on near daily basis in Awdal region along Djibouti border, despite Somaliland govt mediation efforts; dispute over competing land ownership claims, particularly around Zeylac town, began in late 2025, but has taken on greater significance following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, amid reports that Mogadishu could support groups in Awdal to challenge Somaliland rule.

President Ramaphosa announced the deployment of the army to support police in tackling organised violence in several high-crime areas.

Ramaphosa announced military will support police in fight against organised crime. During annual State of Nation address, President Ramaphosa 12 Feb said army would be deployed in Western Cape and Gauteng provinces to support police in combating organised crime, which he described as “most immediate threat to our democracy”. Amid request from provincial officials, acting Police Minister Firoz Cachalia 17 Feb said army would also be sent to Eastern Cape province. Questions remained, however, over state and preparedness of military and its suitability for policing roles. Meanwhile, concurrent judicial and ad hoc parliamentary investigations into criminal-policing nexus brought further troubling allegations; parliamentary witness 3 Feb claimed senior police official Sindile Mfazi, who died in 2021, was poisoned, not killed by COVID-19, after uncovering police corruption. Parliament 17 Feb extended mandate of its investigating committee until late March.

Democratic Alliance (DA) leader to step down. John Steenhuisen 4 Feb announced he would not seek re-election as head of DA – second-largest party in country and ruling African National Congress’ main coalition partner in unity govt – at party congress in April, meaning party will head into late 2026-early 2027 local elections under new leadership.

In another important development. Govt 8 Feb announced it would withdraw its 700 troops deployed as part of UN mission in DR Congo by late 2026, ending almost three decades-old contribution.

High-intensity warfare continued between government and opposition forces in multiple states amid worsening humanitarian strain, while attempts to revive the Kenya-led Tumaini peace initiative stalled, dampening hopes of a diplomatic off-ramp.

Govt-opposition hostilities raged, particularly in Jonglei state. In Jonglei, forces aligned with VP Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) mid-Feb clashed with President Kiir’s South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) in Walgak Payam, Akobo County. Conflict also escalated around White Nile river, and in parts of Nyirol and Uror countries. In Ayod County, SSPDF 21 Feb opened fire on civilians in Pankor village, killing well over a dozen people, though exact number remains contested; foreign actors condemned incident as “deliberate massacre”. Estimated 280,000 people have been displaced in Jonglei since late Dec, while numerous medical facilities were reportedly damaged or looted. In Upper Nile, SSPDF launched coordinated offensives in Longochuk County, which neighbours Nasir County, strategic corridor near Ethiopian and Sudanese borders used as SPLA-IO supply line; opposition late-Feb repelled attack. Fighting also reported in Maban and Ulang countries. In Unity state, heavy fighting erupted mid-Feb in flood-prone Kuerlatjor area of Guit County. In Eastern Equatoria state, SPLA-IO forces and National Salvation Front (NAS) 24-25 Feb launched joint attack on SSPDF base in state capital Torit, claiming to have killed ten SSPDF soldiers.

Attempt to reinvigorate Tumaini peace initiative faltered. After Kenya in late Jan circulated proposed framework to revive govt-opposition peace talks, SPLM-IO 6 Feb made its participation contingent on release of Machar. United Peoples’ Alliance led by Pagan Amum expressed readiness to engage, but similarly demanded release of political prisoners, while South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance led by Gen. Thomas Cirillo rejected proposal, arguing framework was drafted without adequate consultation and risked legitimising political status quo. Collective opposition pushback stalled initiative, closing critical diplomatic off-ramp that could have helped ease escalating hostilities.

Authorities arrested several high-ranking officials. Authorities late Feb arrested several senior officials, including former finance ministers Bak Barnaba Chol and Marial Dongrin Ater. Arrests came as govt, which is in dire financial straits, seeks to regain funds allegedly stolen by senior govt officials.

The U.S. pushed for a humanitarian truce as heavy clashes and relentless drone strikes continued between the army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while both sides pressed ahead with the consolidation of rival administrations.

Army-RSF fighting remained rampant. In North Darfur, clashes escalated around border town of Tine, one of army’s last remaining strongholds in region, prompting Chad 23 Feb to close frontier due to “repeated incursions” (see Chad). RSF late Feb seized control of Misteriha town, stronghold of Musa Hilal, influential tribal leader and rival of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, both of whom hail from Rezeigat community; deadly attack generated mixed reactions among tribal leaders over paramilitary’s tactics to consolidate power in Darfur and could fuel dissent among Arab Darfuris, who form RSF’s core constituency. In South Kordofan, army and allied forces 3 Feb announced they had broken siege of state capital Kadugli. Blue Nile state also saw fierce fighting, amid reports that neighbouring Ethiopia’s involvement in conflict is growing (see Ethiopia).

Expanding drone usage killed scores of civilians. In West Kordofan, for example, army drone 16 Feb killed at least 26 people at displacement camp in Al-Sunut locality, while RSF drones reportedly struck two schools in Dilling town, South Kordofan. Army drone 18 Feb killed at least 18 at water point in Umm Rusum village.

Sudan’s political fragmentation deepened. RSF-led coalition of armed groups and political actors, known as TASIS, held negotiations to finalise formation of parallel govt and appoint key ministers. Meanwhile, army-led govt discussed creation of transitional legislative council that would include army-aligned civilian politicians and armed leaders, as part of broader effort to formalise governance structures.

U.S. pushed for humanitarian truce. U.S. Senior Adviser Massad Boulos continued his mediation efforts and 19 Feb outlined five-pillar strategy linking short-term de-escalation with broader political settlement: (1) immediate humanitarian truce; (2) expanded humanitarian access; (3) permanent ceasefire; (4) political process leading to civilian-led transition; (5) reconstruction. Boulos later said that Quad members, comprising U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and United Arab Emirates, were working to secure separate humanitarian truce to open aid corridors; tensions between Riyadh (which backs army) and Abu Dhabi (which back RSF) undermined efforts, however.

Political tensions remained high as the trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu resumed, while the spate of abductions continued.

State prosecutors faced setbacks in trial of senior opposition figure. Treason trial against main opposition party Chadema’s leader Tundu Lissu resumed 9 Feb after several-month hiatus. Amid arguments over prosecution’s use of anonymous witnesses, High Court 16 Feb ruled parts of protective measures for witnesses unconstitutional, marking win for Lissu’s legal team, and 24 Feb rejected bid by state prosecutors to introduce fresh evidence. Trial suspended same day after prosecutors said they would take matter to Court of Appeal. Chadema’s deputy chairman John Heche 10 Feb said party will only engage in national reconciliation talks if Lissu is released unconditionally and freeze on Chadema’s political activities is lifted. Meanwhile, police 22 Feb said they were monitoring individuals claiming on social media to have formed rebel group called Tanganyika Freedom Fighters to defend civilians in wake of Oct-Nov 2025 post-election crackdown.

PM acknowledged ongoing abduction crisis. Unidentified assailants 12 Feb abducted gemstone trader from Arusha city amid reports that police had been looking for him; his body was found six days later showing signs of torture. PM Mwigulu Nchemba 16 Feb appeared to acknowledge series of enforced disappearances but did not address scale of problem or responsibilities. Meanwhile, Kenyan police 22 Feb foiled suspected attempt to kidnap exiled Tanzanian human rights defender and forcefully transfer him to Tanzania, arresting three people; several attacks and abductions targeted Tanzanian activists in Kenya in 2025.

Govt stepped up international outreach in effort to repair image. FM Mahmoud Thabit Kombo late Jan to mid-Feb embarked on European tour, lobbying EU to lift freeze on €156mn bilateral aid imposed amid post-election crackdown. President Suluhu also active on international front in Feb, notably hosting Ugandan President Museveni, attending investment summit in UAE and AU summit in Ethiopia.

Uganda Tensions lingered within the ruling elite following President Museveni’s re-election.

Museveni’s son stirred up fresh spats with senior govt officials. Chief of defence forces and President Museveni’s son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, 3 Feb branded information and communications technology minister, Chris Baryomunsi, “a traitor” and said he would “never be a minister again” after Baryomunsi publicly acknowledged that Muhoozi’s erratic tweets were making his work as govt spokesperson difficult. Muhoozi around 19 Feb also threatened to arrest Internal Affairs Minister Kahinda Otafiire after latter publicly stated that he would not support Muhoozi for president.

Race for Speaker position emerged. Current Parliament Speaker Anita Among began tacit campaign for re-election after ruling party’s National Executive Committee late Jan reportedly agreed for her to retain position in next parliament. Several other figures in Feb expressed interest in Speaker seat, however. Most serious challenge is likely to come from Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Norbert Mao, who is also president of junior govt partner, Democratic Party, and reportedly enjoys backing of some ruling party leaders opposed to Among.

Ugandan and Congolese forces stepped up joint operations against ADF. Ugandan-Congolese joint campaign against Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern DR Congo (DRC) in Feb helped restore calm to parts of Beni territory (North Kivu province), enabling return of some displaced people. Civil society and local politicians said, however, that security forces are only pushing back ADF further away from Ugandan border and deeper into DRC. Joint forces late Feb also raided ADF camp in Ndimo area of Irumu territory (Ituri province), recovering weapons and rescuing 12 captives. Meanwhile, perceptions that Uganda is providing support to Convention pour la Révolution Populaire (CRP), another armed group active in DRC’s east whose leader Thomas Lubanga lives in Kampala, reportedly undermined bilateral security cooperation.

In another important development. Museveni 20 Feb hosted Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” in Entebbe city, sparking strong condemnation from Sudanese army-aligned govt.

The government approved a bill that would extend President Mnangagwa’s term until 2030, sparking accusations of constitutional coup.

Cabinet proposed sweeping constitutional amendments. Govt 10 Feb backed draft bill proposing changes to constitution that would extend President Mnangagwa’s term, which is due to expire in 2028, by two years and strengthen political power of executive and ruling ZANU-PF-dominated parliament. Amendments include: extending presidential and MPs terms from five to seven years; replacing direct presidential election with selection by parliament; giving parliament power to choose new president if position becomes vacant due to death or illness; and changing defence forces’ role from “upholding” to acting “in accordance with” constitution. Parliamentary Speaker 16 Feb gazetted bill, opening 90-day public consultation before parliamentary vote, which is widely expected to endorse it. Govt and allies continued to insist public referendum on changes not needed despite constitutional experts saying one is necessary; Church leaders 27 Feb also said amendments raise “serious moral and constitutional concerns” and should not proceed without referendum. Move also fuelled tensions within ZANU-PF, with VP Constantino Chiwenga and allies opposing key aspects of constitutional changes.

Opposition and civil society opposed proposed changes, faced attacks. Opposition figures labelled proposed amendments a “constitutional coup”, with opposition leader Job Sikhala’s National Democratic Working Group 11 Feb writing to AU Commission chair Mahmoud Ali Youssouf to call for Zimbabwe’s suspension. Group of war veterans 16 Feb filed application to Constitutional Court seeking to block bill. Amid calls for protests and mobilisation, Mnangagwa’s spokesperson 13 Feb warned “any whiff of fomenting instability will be met decisively”. In series of attacks on those opposing constitutional changes, unidentified assailants 17, 26 Feb reportedly beat civil society activists opposing constitutional changes in capital Harare. EU ambassador 20 Feb voiced concern about shrinking civic space and political repression in country.

Govt agreed International Monetary Fund (IMF) program amid lower inflation. IMF and govt 6 Feb announced agreement with IMF on ten-month Staff-Monitored Program, important step in Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with international financial community. Meanwhile, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 3 Feb said country reached single-digit inflation for first time in three decades.

The October 2025 ceasefire with Pakistan collapsed after Islamabad launched airstrikes in response to deadly militant attacks; major cross-border hostilities killed scores and raised the prospect of a spiralling conflict.

Lethal militants attacks continued at high intensity in Pakistan. Notably, Islamic State suicide bombing 6 Feb killed 38 worshippers and injured around 170 at Shia mosque in Pakistani capital Islamabad; Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi alleged “mastermind” was Afghan national trained in Afghanistan. Tensions with Kabul grew further as militants killed security personnel across Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province over subsequent days. In further escalation, Pakistani Taliban (TTP) suicide car bombing 16 Feb killed 11 soldiers and child at checkpoint in Pakistan’s Bajaur district, and TTP suicide attack on military convoy 21 Feb killed lieutenant colonel and soldier in Bannu district; authorities claimed attacker of latter strike had been member of Afghan Taliban. Effectively collapsing ceasefire agreed in Oct 2025, Pakistan 21 Feb struck Afghanistan’s Paktika and Nangarhar provinces, alleging it had targeted TTP and Islamic State targets, claiming to have killed over 100 militants and accusing Kabul of failing to take substantive action against “anti-Pakistan terrorist groups”. Taliban countered that strikes hit civilian areas and “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children”. Kabul 22 Feb summoned Pakistani envoy to protest airstrikes, adding that “responsibility for any adverse consequences of such actions will rest with the opposing side”. UN’s mission in Afghanistan 23 Feb confirmed airstrikes killed at least 13 civilians. Taliban forces 26 Feb launched attacks along Afghanistan-Pakistan border in Paktia, Khost, Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunar provinces, claiming dozens of Pakistani military installations were captured and dozens of Pakistani security personnel killed. Pakistan responded with ground operations followed by air attacks on military installations in Kabul and Kandahar cities as well as Paktia province. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “an open war”. Pakistan claimed it killed hundreds of Taliban fighters, while Taliban claimed it killed dozens of Pakistani soldiers. Taliban 27 Feb stated openness to dialogue, but Pakistan next day asserted “There won’t be any talks”; without de-escalation, tit-for-tat attacks could spiral into major conflict (see Pakistan).

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a landslide victory in a historic national election, which proceeded largely peacefully and led to a smooth transition of power.

Country held nationwide polls without major violence or disruption. Country’s first election since Aug 2024 ousting of Awami League govt 12 Feb proceeded successfully, with voter turnout reaching 58% of some 128mn voters. Official election results 15 Feb declared BNP winner, with 209 out of 300 seats in national parliament (around 50% of all votes). Alliance led by Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami won 77 seats (31% of all votes, its highest vote share ever), including six for student-led National Citizen Party (NCP). In concurrent referendum on package of constitutional reforms known as “July Charter”, 68% voted in favour. Despite absence of large-scale electoral violence – likely due to visible security forces, apparent lack of efforts by ousted Awami League members to disrupt proceedings and restraint from party leaders – election monitoring NGO Human Rights Support Society 15 Feb recorded over two hundred incidents of violence, which killed three people and injured 300. Claims of voting irregularities remained isolated; Jamaat-e-Islami 15 Feb sought recount in 32 seats.

New BNP govt took helm and set new priorities. Tarique Rahman 17 Feb took oath to become PM and formed 50-member cabinet. At first cabinet meeting next day, govt announced its priorities of controlling prices, improving law and order and maintaining energy supplies; Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed declared “mob culture” would no longer be tolerated, referring to protesters who frequently blocked roads. Underscoring possible political disagreements over July Charter that could fuel tensions, Ahmed 17 Feb stated govt would implement charter “exactly as it was signed”, implying party will not implement aspects on which it dissented.

India, China and U.S. signalled intent to work with new govt. India’s PM Narendra Modi – whose govt had supported ousted Awami League – wrote letter to Rahman in which he expressed intent to strengthen bilateral ties and invited him to India. China’s PM Li Qiang 17 Feb expressed Beijing was looking forward to working with new govt. U.S. President Trump 18 Feb sent congratulatory message to PM Tarique Rahman, urging him to implement trade agreement signed by interim govt on 9 Feb.

The leaders of China and the U.S. held their first phone call of 2026, while Washington sought to engage Beijing and Moscow in trilateral nuclear talks.

China’s President Xi cautioned U.S. President Trump over arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese President Xi and U.S. President Trump 4 Feb held first phone call of year, during which leaders discussed range of topics including China’s purchase of American soybeans, Ukraine war and Taiwan. Xi told Trump that Taiwan remains “most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and urged Trump to be prudent when handling arms sales to Taiwan; media reports early Feb suggested U.S. was mulling huge weapons package to Taiwan that China strongly opposes. The New York Times 27 Feb reported that new arms sales to Taiwan, totalling around $13 billion, had been stalled after White House had reportedly requested officials not to move package forward to ensure successful summit when Trump visits China in April (see Taiwan Strait).

U.S. sought to engage China in nuclear arms control talks. After New Start agreement – bilateral nuclear arms control accord between U.S. and Russia – expired on 5 Feb, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno next day stated U.S. is aware of China conducting nuclear explosive tests. Beijing 11 Feb called accusations groundless, accusing Washington of fabricating allegations to justify resumption of nuclear testing. U.S. continued efforts to forge new trilateral arms control deal with Russia and China. To that end, U.S. officials were reportedly scheduled to hold meeting with Chinese officials in Geneva on 24 Feb, but China’s Foreign Ministry 27 Feb rejected U.S. demand for China to join trilateral negotiations, saying such request is neither fair nor realistic. 

Beijing maintained its maritime presence in the disputed East China Sea, as the diplomatic rupture with Japan rumbled on without an end in sight.

China continued maritime activities in East China Sea. As of 28 Feb, Japan detected 114 Chinese vessels in its contiguous zone, with four vessels detected in its territorial sea. Japanese fishing authorities 12 Feb seized Chinese fishing boat for allegedly refusing to comply with inspection in waters off Nagasaki prefecture in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone; Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara stated Tokyo would take resolute actions to “prevent and deter” illegal fishing operations by foreign vessels. Japan next day released captain. Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi 25 Feb stated Japan would deploy surface-to-air missiles to Yonaguni Island near Taiwan by March 2031.

Diplomatic spat between Tokyo and Beijing persisted. Following landslide victory of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party in lower house election, ensuring PM Sanae Takaichi retained her position, China 9 Feb stated its policy toward Japan will not change based on one election and urged Takaichi to retract comment about Taiwan that triggered rift in Nov 2025, next day adding Tokyo must show sincere desire for dialogue through concrete actions. Chinese FM Wang Yi 14 Feb stated Takaichi’s Nov comments directly challenged China’s sovereignty and “expose Japan’s unabated ambition to invade and colonize Taiwan and persistent intention to revive militarism”. China’s ambassador to UN Fu Cong 18 Feb accused Japan of trying to “intervene militarily in the Taiwan issue”. Takaichi 20 Feb warned of growing Chinese “coercion” and restated govt’s goal to pursue new defence strategy. Underscoring its economic pressure, China 24 Feb imposed export restrictions on 20 Japanese companies and added 20 others to watchlist; Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kei Sato protested strongly, saying measures “will never be tolerated”.

A new regional government took charge in Manipur state, ending one year of President’s Rule imposed due to the surging ethnic conflict; security forces maintained major pressure on Maoist insurgents.

New govt in Manipur state triggered protests by the Kuki-Zo community. New Delhi 4 Feb revoked President’s Rule – direct form of federal governance administered by Delhi-appointed governor – in Manipur state (far north east), first imposed in Feb 2025 due to ethnic conflict between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities. Govt instead appointed ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Yumnam Khemchand Singh (member of Meitei community) as new chief minister and two deputy chief ministers, Nemcha Kipgen and Losii Dikho, members of Kuki-Zo and Naga communities, respectively. Kuki-Zo protesters same day demonstrated against Kipgen’s appointment in New Delhi, calling her to resign for legitimising new govt. Protesters and security forces 5-6 Feb clashed amid stone pelting and alleged arson in Kuki-Zo majority Churachandpur town, where locals rallied to condemn Kuki-Zo politicians’ decision to join new govt; they claimed it violates Guwahati Resolution, which calls for boycotting any govt that fails to guarantee separate Kuki-Zo union territory with legislature.

New Delhi claimed it was on track to end Maoist insurgency by end of March. Home Minister Amit Shah 21 Feb declared govt would eliminate Maoists by its 31 March deadline, raising prospect of intensifying security operations in coming weeks. In Odisha state (east), senior Maoist couple with 17 others 5 Feb surrendered to police. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), security forces 5 Feb killed senior leader in Bijapur district and more than 51 Maoists 7 Feb surrendered in Sukhma and Bijapur districts. Some 2,000 security personnel 17 Feb launched intensive operation along Chhattisgarh-Telangana border. Senior Maoist leader known as “Devuji” 22 Feb surrendered in Telangana state (centre).

Tensions remained elevated between New Delhi and Islamabad. Indian security forces 20 Feb alleged that Pakistani troops violated ceasefire along Line of Control, triggering Indian retaliation (see India-Pakistan). Pakistan’s Defence Minister 6 Feb accused India and Afghanistan of collusion in attack on Shia mosque in Islamabad, which killed dozens (see Pakistan). India same day rejected accusations as “baseless”. New Delhi 22 Feb condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan, as major hostilities erupted between Kabul and Islamabad (see Afghanistan).

India’s Home Minister visited Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) amid local consternation about the impacts of the India-U.S. trade deal, while tensions remained elevated between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Home Minister visited J&K, Chief Minister denounced India-U.S. trade deal. Home Minister Amit Shah 5 Feb began three-day visit to J&K, during which he toured several border outposts and called for “advanced technical solutions” to protect against increased drone activity on international border with Pakistan. Shah 7 Feb called for “vigorous promotional strategy” to revive tourism after April 2025 Pahalgam attack. Senior Congress party leader Tariq Hameed Karra remarked Shah’s frequent visits were “an indication of the fact that things were not normal in J&K”, citing eight districts that had seen militancy over three months. Meanwhile, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah 11 Feb declared new trade deal between govt and U.S. announced 2 Feb “detrimental” to region’s horticulture sector, claiming duty-free import on U.S. goods “will hit J&K very badly”; deal could have damaging economic impacts and further fuel alienation among local population.

Security forces continued anti-militant operations. Security forces 4 Feb killed two alleged Jaish-e-Muhammad militants in Jammu’s Udhampur district, and same day killed another militant in Kishtwar district. Security forces 8 Feb apprehended alleged intruder crossing from Pakistan into Samba district. Security forces 22 Feb killed three alleged Jaish-e-Muhammed militants, including commander, in Kishtwar.

India and Pakistan traded fire across Line of Control. India’s Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers 12 Feb reportedly met at the request of latter regarding gunfire incident; Indian forces reportedly clarified that firing was part of scheduled training exercise. Indian security forces 20 Feb alleged that Pakistani troops violated ceasefire along Line of Control in Kupwara district, triggering Indian retaliation; no loss of life was reported. Fuelling tensions, Pakistan’s Defence Minister 6 Feb accused India and Afghanistan of collusion in suicide attack at Shia mosque in Islamabad, which killed dozens (see Pakistan); India same day rejected accusations as “baseless”, saying that Pakistan was “blaming others for its home-grown ills”.

Separatists launched a deadly attack in Papua, while Jakarta pursued an active foreign policy by engaging with the U.S.-led Board of Peace overseeing Gaza and signing a landmark defence treaty with Australia.

In Papua, separatists killed two pilots. Armed assailants 11 Feb killed two pilots of small civilian plane that landed at Korowai Batu airstrip, Boven Digoel Regency (South Papua province), prompting temporary closure of 11 airports in Papua as precaution; incident renewed fears over air travel safety in areas where separatist groups operate. Separately, umbrella group United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) 10 Feb alleged military bombed makeshift refugee camp in Puncak Regency (Central Papua province) and had “relentlessly attacked” region since late Jan; group also accused security forces of killing Papuan man during raid in Intan Jaya Regency on 2 Feb. Authorities denied intensified operations, attributing violence instead to “armed criminal group”.

Prabowo attended Board of Peace meeting, expressed will to deploy forces to Gaza. While participating in 19 Feb inaugural meeting of Board of Peace – body launched by U.S. President Trump with UN Security Council endorsement to oversee Gaza’s transition (see Israel/Palestine) – President Prabowo Subianto (“Prabowo”) reaffirmed Indonesia’s readiness to support prospective international stabilisation force in Gaza, after military 15 Feb said up to 8,000 troops could be ready by end-June for deployment. Foreign Ministry reiterated that Indonesia’s role would be strictly humanitarian, with no participation in combat operations. On sidelines of the meeting in U.S., Jakarta reached reciprocal trade deal with Washington in which Indonesia will eliminate tariffs on 99% of American goods, while U.S. will maintain tariffs of 19% on most Indonesian exports.

Indonesia and Australia signed historic security treaty. In capital Jakarta, President Prabowo and Australian PM Anthony Albanese 6 Feb signed bilateral defence treaty first announced in Nov 2025, signalling deepening security cooperation.

North Korea held its five-year party congress and warned Seoul about cross-border drone incursions, while strains in the South Korea-U.S. military alliance remained discernible.

North Korea held its ruling party congress. The ruling Korean Workers’ Party 19 Feb opened its ninth party congress, held every five years. Leader Kim Jong Un hailed country’s progress since 2021 and declared “everything has fundamentally changed” after very difficult period during COVID-19 pandemic and collapse of talks with U.S., striking optimistic note on home front while reaffirming both North’s hostile policy towards South Korea and total rejection of denuclearisation. Pre-congress, Kim 18 Feb unveiled 50 new launch vehicles for nuclear-capable short-range missiles.

Drone incursions continued to fuel inter-Korean tensions. South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young 10 and 18 Feb acknowledged that drones had crossed into North Korea during President Lee’s administration, expressing “official regret”. Chung 18 Feb stated he sought to reinstate no-fly zone agreed under now-suspended 2018 inter-Korean military pact. Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong 13 Feb voiced appreciation for South Korea’s regret over drones but called on Seoul to prevent further “provocative” violations of sovereignty, and 19 Feb warned future incursions could trigger “severe” response, whether civilian or state actors are responsible.

U.S. military drill with Japan prompted questions about South Korean-U.S. alliance. U.S. fighter jets, stationed in South Korea, 16 and 18 Feb participated in aerial drills with Japan over East China Sea and Sea of Japan, and on latter date flew over Yellow Sea in area between air defence identification zones of China and South Korea; in response, Beijing dispatched fighter aircraft that resulted in “rare standoff”, according to South Korean media. South Korean officials lodged protests with U.S. counterparts, as incident prompted fresh concerns in Seoul that Washington seeks to repurpose its Korean-based forces to focus on China in addition to North Korea. South Korea and U.S. 25 Feb announced annual “Freedom Shield” exercises on 9-19 March, amid reports U.S. had opposed South Korean call for smaller drills.

In another important development. Court 19 Feb sentenced former President Yoon to life imprisonment for insurrection for Dec 2024 declaration of martial law. 

Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing sought to secure his hold on power after dominating the December-January elections, while armed groups captured military outposts in the north.

Min Aung Hlaing consolidated presidential power post-election. Election commission 3 Feb announced final results of Dec-Jan polls, with pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party winning 231 of 263 lower house seats, 108 of 157 in upper house and 379 of 605 in state and regional assemblies; new parliament will hold first session 16 March, after which MPs will choose parliamentary speaker and deputy before selecting president – likely to be Min Aung Hlaing, after he steps down as army commander-in-chief. In bid to consolidate control ahead of formation of new administration, National Defence and Security Council (led by Min Aung Hlaing) 3 Feb passed law establishing president-appointed Union Consultative Council that will oversee both civil and military matters. Move comes after late-Jan amendment ensured Constitutional Tribunal, highest authority on constitutional interpretation, is more beholden to president. Meanwhile, activists and resistance groups 1 Feb marked fifth anniversary of coup with protests in several locations.

In north, armed groups continued to advance in Kachin state. Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied resistance groups 2 Feb onwards captured five military outposts around Waingmaw town, which lies across Ayeyarwady river from state capital Myitkyina. In response, military launched artillery fire from nearby mountains. Elsewhere in Kachin, KIA clashed with army in Hpakant and Bhamo townships and around Indawgyi Lake in Mohnyin township.

In west, Arakan Army and regime forces battled. In Rakhine state (west), heavy fighting between Arakan Army and regime forces from 23 Feb erupted around Sittwe township, with regime airstrikes reportedly killing civilians; clashes also occurred in Kyaukphyu township as regime forces attempted unsuccessfully to advance on Arakan army positions.

Crackdown on cyberscams continued. Reports emerged mid-Feb that regime had fired Lt.-Gen. Tun Tun Naung, appointed in Dec to lead govt’s anti-scam efforts, for allegedly taking protection payments from cyberscammers. Chinese authorities late Jan-2 Feb executed some 15 members of two “family criminal” groups for running scam complexes in Myanmar’s Kokang region.

The October 2025 ceasefire with Afghanistan collapsed after Islamabad launched airstrikes in response to deadly militant attacks; major cross-border hostilities killed scores and raised the prospect of a spiralling conflict.

Lethal militants attacks continued at high intensity. In Balochistan province, separatist militants early Feb continued for several days the offensive launched 31 Jan, killing 17 security personnel and 31 civilians. Army 5 Feb said it had successfully concluded counter-insurgency operation, killing over 200 militants, whom it described as “Indian-sponsored”. Islamic State suicide bombing 6 Feb killed 38 worshippers and injured around 170 at Shia mosque in capital Islamabad; Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi alleged “mastermind” was Afghan national trained in Afghanistan. Tensions with Kabul grew further as militant attacks killed security personnel across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province: militants 11 Feb killed four police officers in Dera Ismail Khan district and 14 Feb killed police officer in Bajaur district. In further escalation, Pakistani Taliban (TTP) suicide car bombing 16 Feb killed 11 soldiers and child at checkpoint in Bajaur district, and TTP suicide attack on military convoy 21 Feb killed lieutenant colonel and soldier in Bannu district; authorities claimed perpetrator of latter attack had been member of Afghan Taliban. Effectively collapsing ceasefire agreed in Oct 2025, air force 21 Feb struck Afghanistan’s Paktika and Nangarhar provinces, alleging it had targeted TTP and Islamic State targets, claiming to have killed over 100 militants and accusing Kabul of failing to take substantive action against “anti-Pakistan terrorist groups”. Taliban countered strikes hit civilian area and “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children”, and 22 Feb summoned Pakistani envoy to protest airstrikes. Taliban forces 26 Feb launched attacks along border in Paktia, Khost, Nangarhar, Nuristan and Kunar provinces, claiming dozens of Pakistani military installations were captured and dozens of Pakistani security personnel killed. Pakistan responded with ground operations followed by air attacks on military installations in Kabul and Kandahar cities and in Paktia province. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “an open war”. Pakistan late Feb claimed it killed hundreds of Taliban fighters, while Taliban claimed it killed dozens of Pakistani soldiers. Taliban 27 Feb stated openness to dialogue, but Pakistan next day asserted “There won’t be any talks”; without de-escalation, tit-for-tat attacks could spiral into major conflict (see Afghanistan).

Uncertainty continued to shroud the timeline for the Bangsamoro region’s inaugural elections, while localised violence persisted.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro region amid uncertainty over election. Localised violence persisted in Bangsamoro region. Notably, authorities 15 Feb seized 11 military-type firearms, including M60 machine gun, from rival Moro factions disputing control of strategic areas in Nabalawag town, Cotabato province, part of Special Geographic Area. Gunmen 17 Feb ambushed civilian vehicle in Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao del Sur province, killing one and injuring two. Meanwhile, after Electoral Commission in Jan postponed regional parliamentary elections, Philippines’ congress considered legislation in Feb to move polls to Sept 2026; speculation, however, mounted that polls may be put off until 2028, when next presidential election is scheduled.

Security forces sustained operations against communist rebels. Clashes between government forces and Communist militants of New People’s Army (NPA) occurred in Visayas (Samar and Negros) and Mindanao (Agusan del Sur), injuring one and killing four combatants and civilians alike. Army in Negros Oriental province 16 Feb stated that operations had prevented NPA’s attempt to reestablish bases.

In other important developments. National Police Chief Jose Melencio Nartatez Jr. placed all police units on heightened alert for potential protests in response to hearings 23 Feb beginning at International Criminal Court to assess charges of crimes against humanity against former president Rodrigo Duterte, who conducted so-called “war on drugs” between 2011-2019. VP Sara Duterte 18 Feb announced intention to run in 2028 presidential election, amid series of impeachment complaints submitted against her.

Tensions continued between China and the Philippines amid rival military exercises in the disputed South China Sea (SCS) and adjacent waters.

China and Philippines (and Manila’s allies) conducted drills in SCS. After China and Philippines resumed dialogue on sidelines of ASEAN summit in late Jan, including over disputes in SCS, tensions persisted in Feb. Armed Forces of the Philippines 2 Feb designated exercise area within its Exclusive Economic Zone for allied maritime activities between Jan and March, emphasising the waters are more than 600 nautical miles from Chinese mainland. Philippine Navy same day reported monitoring 48 Chinese vessels, including warships, operating around disputed reefs. U.S. and Philippines early Feb conducted joint air drills in SCS, as China’s military 2-6 Feb conducted air and maritime patrol and accused Manila of roping in “countries outside the region” to stir up trouble. After Philippine naval officials 11 Feb stated Manila and Washington would conduct over 500 military and security activities in 2026, the Philippines, Australia and U.S. 15-16 Feb conducted joint patrol exercises in SCS, prompting China to respond with “combat readiness patrols”. Philippines, Japan and U.S. late Feb conducted joint exercises in Bashi Channel between Taiwan and Philippines, marking first joint drills beyond SCS and triggering angry response from China. Earlier, Philippine military 10 Feb reiterated it would maintain its “transparency initiative”, arguing public disclosure of maritime incidents involving China was not “an irritant” to diplomacy. Chinese state media 12 Feb showed elements of its military’s cyberspace force stationed on Fiery Cross Reef (artificial island in disputed Spratlys).

U.S. committed to deploy more advanced missile systems to Philippines. In annual alliance talks with Manila, U.S. mid-Feb committed to increase deployments of advanced missile systems and unmanned systems to Philippines as part of deterrence against China; announcement follows deployment of Typhon mid-range and anti-ship systems in Philippines’ northern Luzon region in 2024, which China strongly protested.

President Dissanayake’s government sought to advance its reform agenda as it navigated political controversies and ethnic tensions; the capital Colombo hosted a series of high-profile visitors.

Polling revealed govt’s popularity, opposition figures decried alleged corruption. Local NGO Verité Research 15 Feb published opinion survey showing 65% approval rate for current govt (which came into office in Sept 2024), up 3% from Feb last year and 40% higher than previous govt’s approval rate in July 2024. Govt sought to make progress with reforms: parliament 17 Feb passed Parliamentary Pensions (Repeal) Bill, abolishing pension entitlements for members of parliament and their spouses. Samudika Jayaratne 5 Feb officially assumed duties as Auditor-General of Sri Lanka, becoming first woman to hold position and ending ten-month vacancy. However, govt continued to deal with political controversies. Notably, debate deepened over series of coal shipments for govt-owned Lakvijaya Coal Power Plant in Norochcholai, Puttalam district (North Western province), after coal proved to be below quality, potentially causing major financial loss; opposition figure S.M. Marikkar alleged entire coal procurement process was rigged. Meanwhile, two unidentified gunmen 13 Feb killed lawyer Buddhika Mallawarachchi and his wife in Colombo; Mallawarachchi reportedly acted as defence counsel for alleged organised crime figures. Perpetrators may be connected to other high-profile murders targeting underworld figures, according to police.

Govt faced pressure from ethnic and religious constituencies. After Tamil leaders accused govt of seeking to delay provincial council elections, Parliamentary Speaker Jagath Wickramaratne 20 Feb announced composition of committee tasked with examining and recommending new electoral system for future provincial council polls. Hundreds of Buddhist monks 20 Feb rallied in Colombo against alleged govt disrespect of their religion and disregard for tradition that they be consulted in matters of state.

High-level foreign officials visited island. International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva 17 Feb met Dissanayake, focusing on post-cyclone assistance and economic recovery. British Deputy PM David Lammy 17 Feb visited Sri Lanka, commending recent economic and social reform initiatives. EU-Sri Lanka Joint Commission 12 Feb held 27th session in Colombo, focusing on govt reform plans, human rights, security and sustainable development.

China maintained its aerial and maritime presence around Taiwan and cautioned Washington against arms sales to Taipei; Beijing hosted Taiwan’s main opposition party in a rare cross-strait exchange.

Beijing continued its military presence around Taiwan. As of 28 Feb, Taiwan detected 179 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 136 crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone; Taiwan spotted 182 sightings of naval vessels in surrounding waters. Media reports, citing Taiwan’s defence ministry, alleged that Chinese fighter jets carried out unusually risky manoeuvres during major drills in Dec, including firing flares at Taiwanese military aircraft. Meanwhile, Australian warship 20-21 Feb transited Taiwan Strait.

Prospective U.S. weapons package for Taiwan triggered alarm in China. Reports early Feb emerged that U.S. was preparing large arms deal, which could include advanced missile defence systems and exceed $11bn package announced in Dec – which was largest ever. Beijing reportedly warned Washington that arms sales could imperil U.S. President Trump’s planned state visit to China in April. During 4 Feb phone call with Trump, Chinese President Xi stated U.S. should exercise “prudence” in relation to arms sales, fuelling speculation and media reports that Trump may delay deal; call also marked first time that a U.S. president has acknowledged discussing arms sales to Taiwan with a Chinese leader, breaking longstanding U.S. convention (see China-U.S.). Taiwan’s President Lai 5 Feb phoned Trump, later describing ties as “rock solid”.

China hosted Taiwanese opposition for dialogue. Delegation from Taiwanese opposition Kuomintang party 2-4 Feb visited China’s capital Beijing to attend forum last held in 2016 with Chinese Communist Party to discuss non-political issues. China 4 Feb announced it would resume tourism to Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu from Chinese city Shanghai, and 10 Feb stated it would support “patriotic pro-unification forces” and “resolutely strike against Taiwan independence separatist forces”. Meanwhile, opposition-controlled parliament in Taiwan 23 Feb began party caucus negotiation over $40bn special defence budget proposed by govt, agreeing to advance budget, alongside two other versions proposed by opposition parties, for parliamentary committee review; Kuomintang and other opposition parties have repeatedly blocked President Lai’s planned defence spending increases.

The ceasefire with Cambodia remained fragile amid alleged violations and an exchange of frosty rhetoric, while the conservative Bhumjaithai Party won a resounding general election victory.

Ceasefire with Cambodia faced significant strains. Underscoring instability of December truce, Thai media The Nation 8 Feb cited unnamed security officials warning “tensions could erupt at any moment”. Cambodia 21 Feb reiterated claim Thai military was occupying at least 14 locations in four Cambodian provinces and placed shipping containers and barbed wire in several locations preventing tens of thousands of Cambodians from returning; Thai officials acknowledged seizing areas from which Cambodian troops launched attacks, but asserted it was merely establishing 500-meter buffer zone. Thai soldiers 11 Feb and 27 Feb lost legs in landmine explosions. Thai and Cambodian troops 24 Feb exchanged fire in Phlan Hin Paet Kon area, Si Sa Ket province. Meanwhile, PM Anutin Charnvirakul 10 Feb announced intention to cancel 2001 agreement with Cambodia on overlapping maritime claims in Gulf of Thailand. Thai Navy 12-13 Feb reportedly pushed dozens of Cambodian fishing boats from Thai waters near Koh Kut island.

Bhumjaithai Party placed first in general election. PM Anutin Charnvirakul’s conservative Bhumjaithai Party 8 Feb won general election, securing 193 out of 500 seats and becoming first conservative party to win election in 21st century. The progressive People’s Party (formerly Move Forward Party) came second, winning 118 seats, while populist Pheu Thai Party won 74. Over 60% of voters also cast ballots in favour of amending military-drafted 2017 constitution. Elections faced widespread complaints about voting irregularities, including concerns that QR codes on ballots could be used to undermine secret ballot. Anutin 13 Feb announced Pheu Thai would join Bhumjaithai-led coalition.

Violence in deep south simmered. In Yala province, IED attack 8 Feb wounded ranger in Bannang Sata district. In Narathiwat province, IED explosion 10 Feb injured three in Sri Sakhon district, while seven bombs 14-15 Feb exploded in various locations in Yi-ngo and Rangae districts. Roadside IED explosion 27 Feb wounded woman in Muang district, Yala. PM Anutin 17 Feb made veiled comment about Malaysia’s alleged role in insurgency, stating that militants freely cross Thailand-Malaysia border and govt must request neighbour’s “cooperation in not providing any support or assistance” to militants.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance travelled to Armenia and Azerbaijan, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the peace process while sealing a series of bilateral trade and security deals with Yerevan.

Vance pushed peace and trade during “historic” trip to Armenia. Vance 9-10 Feb travelled to Armenia and met with PM Pashinyan before heading to Azerbaijan, in highest-ranking visit by U.S. official to Caucasus in decades. Trip, which both countries called “historic”, followed U.S. President Trump’s momentous intervention in peace process in Aug, when he proposed framework for transport arrangement known as “Trump Route”; proposal addressed sensitive issue of transit between two non-contiguous parts of Azerbaijan via Armenia and opened door to steady diplomatic progress between the two sides (see below). During his stay, Vance reaffirmed Washington’s pledge to deliver route, signalling U.S. commitment to peace process, but there was little new announced about project. Instead, visit was dominated by trade and security deals, though biggest surprise was Vance’s explicit endorsement of Pashinyan in 7 June parliamentary elections.

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process continued apace. In symbolic move, 19 Azerbaijani experts arrived in Armenia via newly-delimited and demarcated section of land border to attend 13-14 Feb roundtable on peace process. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani MP 2 Feb implied that Baku might be willing to sign peace agreement before Armenia’s June parliamentary elections if its draft constitution, expected to be completed in March, does not contain references to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Tensions between govt and church persisted. Authorities 15 Feb indicted head of Armenian Apostolic Church, Garegin II, after he defrocked pro-Pashinyan bishop in late Jan, and banned him from leaving Armenia to attend conference in Austria. Pashinyan and church have been in low-level political conflict for years, but tensions deepened after church figures led protests in 2024 against concessions to Azerbaijan during peace talks.

In another important development. U.S.-Israeli strikes on neighbouring Iran – critical security partner for Armenia – raised concerns in Yerevan about potential spillover (see Iran).

U.S. Vice President JD Vance travelled to Azerbaijan and Armenia, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the peace process while signing a new strategic partnership charter with Baku.

Vance pushed peace and trade during “historic” trip to Azerbaijan. Vance 10-11 Feb travelled to Azerbaijan and met with President Aliyev after similar tour of Armenia, in highest-ranking visit by U.S. official to Caucasus in decades. Trip, which both countries called “historic”, followed U.S. President Trump’s momentous intervention in peace process in Aug, when he proposed framework for transport arrangement known as “Trump Route”; proposal addressed sensitive issue of transit between two non-contiguous parts of Azerbaijan via Armenia and opened door to steady diplomatic progress between the two sides (see below). During trip, Vance reaffirmed Washington’s pledge to deliver route, signalling U.S. commitment to peace process, but there was little new announced about project. Instead, central outcome was signing of U.S.-Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership Charter, framework agreement designed to institutionalise long-term cooperation across security, energy, technology and regional connectivity. Vance also mentioned that Azerbaijan would receive patrol boats from U.S., but provided no further details. Overall, visit represented qualitative upgrade in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations, moving from episodic cooperation to institutionalised strategic framework.

Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process continued apace. In symbolic move, 19 Azerbaijani experts arrived in Armenia via newly-delimited and demarcated section of land border to attend 13-14 Feb roundtable on peace process. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani MP 2 Feb implied that Baku might be willing to sign peace agreement before Armenia’s June parliamentary elections if its draft constitution, expected to be completed in March, does not contain references to Nagorno-Karabakh.

U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran raised concern in Baku. Foreign Ministry 28 Feb issued statement following joint U.S.-Israel attack on Iran expressing “deep concern” at “military escalation” and calling for respect of “sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all states”. Major upheaval in Iran – which has large ethnic Azerbaijani population – could trigger huge refugee inflows difficult for Baku to manage.

Kyiv sanctioned President Lukashenko for his support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Minsk organised military drills, and Lithuania and Poland reported more incursions of Belarusian smuggling balloons.

Kyiv imposed sanctions on Lukashenko over war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy 18 Feb announced that Kyiv was sanctioning President Lukashenko and would “significantly intensify” countermeasures in response to his “assistance in the killing of Ukrainians”. Zelenskyy added that Lukashenko was playing along with Russian President Putin in “his dangerous geopolitical game” by hosting Russia’s Oreshnik missiles and supporting its army. Shortly after, Lukashenko 25 Feb travelled to Moscow for talks with Putin.

Belarus called up reservists for military drills. Defence Ministry 17 Feb announced that eligible men in western Belarus would receive summons for military training as part of wider army readiness check launched in mid-Jan.

Relations with neighbouring Lithuania and Poland remained tense. Balloons carrying contraband continued drifting from Belarus into Polish and Lithuanian airspace, forcing another temporary closure of Lithuania’s Vilnius airport on 17 Feb. Vilnius 3 Feb detained 28 people suspected of involvement in smuggling operations, while Warsaw 12 Feb detained eight on similar charges.

Siniša Karan claimed a narrow victory in the re-run of Republika Srpska’s (RS) presidential election, as the entity’s former president Milorad Dodik made more separatist threats.

Dodik ally Siniša Karan narrowly defeated opposition candidate Branko Blanuša in 8 Feb RS presidential re-run, which took place across 17 municipalities after authorities registered serious irregularities in Nov snap poll. Karan, who will serve out remainder of Dodik’s mandate until Oct general elections, framed victory as endorsement of former president and “referendum” against High Representative Christian Schmidt, whose authority his SNSD party rejects. Following vote, Dodik – who was removed from office in Aug for defying Schmidt’s authority but remains head of SNSD – reiterated his familiar secessionist rhetoric, 9 Feb saying country had “collapsed” and that it was time for RS independence; he added that entity had international partners it could rely on, including U.S. administration under President Trump. U.S. State Dept 12 Feb responded by stating that it would “use diplomatic tools to support stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and oppose actions that introduce threats of instability”.

An Iranian-made drone struck a British military base in the Republic of Cyprus, demonstrating the far-reaching repercussions of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran; earlier, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders held a one-on-one meeting.

Drone hit UK base in Republic of Cyprus. U.S. and Israel 28 Feb launched all-out war on Iran, which retaliated fiercely via missile and drone attacks across Middle East (see Iran). Iranian-made drone night of 2 March reportedly struck runway at RAF Akrotiri – UK military airbase located on southern coast of Cyprus that hosts British and U.S. aircraft; additional drones were reportedly intercepted. Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides responded that “Our country is not participating in any way, nor does it intend to become part of any military operation”. UK PM Keir Starmer 2 March announced UK was accepting U.S. request to use base but limited operations to those targeting Iranian missile sites; further attacks could continue to target base in coming days or weeks.

Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders pursued engagement. Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman 24 Feb met one-on-one for approximately 90 minutes in buffer zone for first direct meeting without international facilitation; Christodoulides called it “honest and open discussion” and reiterated goal of “resuming substantive talks”, while Erhürman praised “one of the most open and frank meetings so far”; pair reportedly focused on confidence-building measures. Earlier, Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 11 Feb met Turkish President Erdoğan in Ankara (see Türkiye), where Mitsotakis claimed “window of opportunity” now exists to solve Cyprus problem. Ahead of his meeting with UN Sec-Gen António Guterres, Erhürman 11 Feb said he would share “the will of our people for a solution”. UN Special Envoy María Ángela Holguín 15 Feb published opinion article in which she claimed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides had “yet to show any significant progress” on trust-building measures and stated sides must “explore ideas and viable pathways to restart a more formal negotiation process in the best possible way, beginning in July”; last direct negotiations collapsed in 2017. Christodoulides 20 Feb rejected waiting until July.

The ruling party Georgian Dream moved to outlaw non-recognition of the government, while Tbilisi courted Washington amid its worsening ties with the EU and UK.

Ruling party sought to ban delegitimisation of govt. Georgian Dream 16 Feb introduced legislation that would criminalise “systematic non-recognition” of govt, amid opposition forces and other critics’ continued questioning of party’s legitimacy following 2024 election. Those found guilty could face up to three years in prison, according to proposal.

Tbilisi courted Washington as its relations with EU and UK suffered. U.S. VP JD Vance skipped Georgia during his Caucasus trip (see Armenia, Azerbaijan), effectively snubbing country that used to be centrepiece of U.S. Caucasus strategy. He did, however, hold brief conversation with President Kavelashvili, along with U.S. Sec-State Marco Rubio and FM Maka Botchorishvili, 5 Feb on sidelines of Winter Olympics in Italian city of Milan. Kavelashvili said he and Rubio held follow-up meeting, in which Rubio reportedly promised that U.S. is seeking to repair ties spoiled during Biden administration; U.S. did not comment. Meanwhile, European Commission 11 Feb voted to suspend visa-free regime for Georgian diplomatic passport holders, highlighting tense relations. London 24 Feb sanctioned two pro-govt television channels, accusing them of promoting “Russian disinformation”; Foreign Ministry 26 Feb summoned British Ambassador Gareth Ward over decision.

The formation of a new government ended Kosovo’s long-running political stalemate and raised hope for a revival of the stalled normalisation process with Serbia; Pristina, Tirana and Zagreb strengthened military ties.

Formation of new govt raised hopes for progress in Kosovo-Serbia normalisation. Following Vetëvendosje party’s victory in Dec 2025 snap elections, lawmakers 11 Feb approved new govt led by Albin Kurti, ending over year-long political deadlock. EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas same day welcomed news, which she said could inject “new momentum” into Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, and expressed her readiness to host high-level meeting between Kurti and Serbia’s President Vučić “soon”. EU Special Representative for Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Peter Sørensen late Feb held separate talks with Kurti and Vučić.

Kosovo, Albania and Croatia announced joint military drills. Defence ministers from Kosovo, Albania and Croatia 11 Feb agreed to hold military exercise in Croatia in 2026, triggering sharp rebuke from Vučić, who next day called cooperation an “alliance” that posed significant threat to Serbia. Vučić also highlighted that Belgrade was developing its own capabilities to “deter any potential aggressor”. 

President Japarov ousted his security chief and long-time ally, Kamchybek Tashiev, sending shockwaves through Kyrgyzstan as he moved to consolidate power ahead of the January 2027 elections.

Japarov removed his powerful security chief and close ally, consolidating power. President Japarov 10 Feb fired his long-time ally and powerful head of State Committee for National Security (GKNB), Kamchybek Tashiev, who had spearheaded govt’s crackdowns on political opposition and independent media in recent years. Japarov also removed several of Tashiev’s deputies and announced sweeping reforms to GKNB, which had expanded dramatically under his tenure. Announcement reportedly surprised Tashiev, who was receiving medical treatment in Germany at the time, and raised fears of instability, though he later said he would respect decision. In days that followed, Japarov purged other associates of his erstwhile ally, including Parliament Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, who hails from southern Kyrgyzstan, Tashiev’s power base. Japarov 13 Feb said actions were aimed at preventing divisions within govt and society at large. Analysts, however, argued that he is sidelining rivals and cementing his grip on power ahead of Jan 2027 presidential elections, with think tank Carnegie Endowment 17 Feb warning that country is “on the brink of becoming a personalist autocracy”.

In important international developments. Bishkek 4-5 Feb hosted B5+1 forum, bringing together officials and business leaders from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and U.S., as Washington expands its regional presence. Delegates from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 16 Feb met in Kazakh capital Astana to discuss expansion of trade and connectivity with Taliban authorities in Afghanistan, as well as regional security concerns. As EU pushed to finalise 20th sanctions package against Russia, EU envoy David O’Sullivan 26 Feb urged Bishkek to clamp down on re-export of sanctioned EU goods from Kyrgyzstan to Russia.

U.S.-brokered negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war continued, though without apparent progress on the key issues of territory and security guarantees; meanwhile, authorities moved to restrict online communications.

Russia and U.S. eyed economic deals amid Ukraine talks. U.S.-mediated trilateral peace talks to end Ukraine war continued between Washington, Moscow and Kyiv. Sides reportedly made progress on technical issues such as ceasefire mechanisms and monitoring, but failed to agree on key issues like security guarantees and status of Donbas region, which Russia demands Ukraine cede. In parallel, reports emerged of U.S.-Russia talks on package of economic agreements as part of broader deal on Ukraine. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy 6 Feb claimed Moscow had offered Washington deals worth up to $12tn. Media outlet Bloomberg 12 Feb reported that Russia had floated several proposals, including Moscow’s possible return to U.S. dollar payment system and joint U.S.-Russian ventures in oil and critical mineral extraction, while The Economist said figures close to Trump held talks on purchase of stakes in Russian energy assets. Even so, Trump 19 Feb extended Ukraine-related U.S. sanctions on Russia for another year.

Ukrainian airstrikes against Russia continued. Notably, Ukraine targeted energy grid and other key infrastructure in Bryansk and Belgorod regions, leaving residents without electricity or water. Kyiv 12, 20 Feb used domestically-produced Flamingo missiles to strike ammunition depot in Volgograd region and weapons factory in Udmurt Republic; 25 Feb struck fertiliser plant in Smolensk region, killing at least seven. Meanwhile, authorities 8 Feb blamed Ukraine for 6 Feb assassination of high-profile general, Vladimir Alekseev, in Moscow, which Kyiv denied.

Moscow moved to restrict social media usage. Authorities 10 Feb sought to restrict widely-used messaging application, Telegram, citing company’s non-compliance with Russian law, including alleged failure to prevent its use by terrorists and criminals. Rights watchdog Amnesty International same day said move is linked to broader crackdown on digital space.

In another important development. U.S. 23-24 Feb met with Russian and Chinese delegations for nuclear talks in Swiss city of Geneva after New START Treaty – last remaining nuclear weapons control treaty between U.S. and Russia – expired 5 Feb.

President Rahmon’s 17-day absence raised speculation about his health, while regional cooperation continued apace.

Rahmon disappeared for over two weeks, fuelling rumours about his health. Rumours began to circulate about Rahmon, who had not been seen in public since 28 Jan, with many speculating about president’s health; media outlet Radio France Europe/Radio Liberty 13 Feb reported that he may have travelled to China for medical treatment. Govt 6 Feb published photo of his son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, in meetings with senior officials, which only fuelled speculation. Rahmon 14 Feb reappeared, however, without providing any explanation for his absence, and held talks with President of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Zou Jiayi, in capital Dushanbe.

In important international developments. Bishkek 4-5 Feb hosted B5+1 forum, bringing together officials and business leaders from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and U.S., as Washington expands its regional presence. Meanwhile, delegates from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 16 Feb met in Kazakh capital Astana to discuss expansion of trade and connectivity with Taliban authorities in Afghanistan, as well as regional security concerns; during talks, Kazakh’s representative, Yerkin Tukumov, underscored importance of developing “common position” toward Kabul. 

The parliamentary body overseeing the peace initiative with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) produced its first recommendations, laying the legal groundwork for ending the conflict.

PKK peace initiative reached new milestone. After more than six months of consultations – and one year since PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan made historic call for group to disarm – parliamentary peace commission 19 Feb approved landmark report setting out recommendations on legal framework and next steps for Ankara’s peace initiative with PKK. Approved by five political parties, report reflected lowest common denominator and is framed around security, restoring public order and preserving Turkish state’s unity. Pro-Kurdish DEM party voted in favour of report but published dissenting opinion, criticising omission of reference to “Kurdish issue” and measures it demanded, such as truth and reconciliation commission and Kurdish-language education; DEM warned that without such measures, process could be reduced to merely disarmament plan without lasting political settlement. Öcalan 27 Feb hailed step as positive and reiterated his demand for Ankara to pass laws to formalise process, saying “We aim to close the era of violence-based politics”. If reconciliation track holds between Syrian govt and the Syrian Democratic Forces, it could open more space for Ankara-PKK process to advance (see Syria).

Ankara remained firmly opposed to U.S.-Israel war on Iran. Govt pursued intensive diplomacy during Feb to find negotiated off-ramp between U.S. and Iran. In speech on 28 Feb after U.S. and Israel launched all-out war on Iran, President Erdoğan criticised violation of Iran’s sovereignty and warned attacks could drag region into “circle of fire”. Ankara fears weakening of Iran’s central authority could lead to state fragmentation with consequences for Türkiye, including refugee inflows and flare-up of Iranian Kurdish separatism (see Iran).

Ankara sought to expand cooperation with Greece. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan 11 Feb met in capital Ankara, where both leaders agreed to expand areas of cooperation in several deals covering migration management, trade, culture and science; high-level diplomatic engagement appears to be part of joint effort to keep bilateral frictions contained, while expanding areas of practical cooperation. Sides, however, did not make tangible progress on resolving longstanding maritime disputes. 

As the Russia-Ukraine war entered its fifth year and fighting raged on, U.S.-brokered peace negotiations continued, though without apparent progress on the key issues of territory and security guarantees.

Frontline fighting and punishing Russian aerial attacks continued. Intense fighting persisted along eastern frontline, as sides fought over several strategic towns, including Pokrovsk, Kupiansk and Huliaipole. Russia also continued its punishing airstrikes across Ukraine, leaving millions without heat and electricity during particularly harsh winter. Notably, Russia 1 Feb hit bus carrying miners in Dnipropetrovsk region, killing at least 12 people; 26 Feb launched massive strikes across country, injuring dozens. Ukraine retaliated with strikes on energy and military facilities across Russia (see Russia).

Washington struggled to achieve breakthrough in peace push. U.S.-brokered peace talks to end Ukraine war continued between Washington, Moscow and Kyiv. Sides reportedly made progress on technical issues such as ceasefire mechanisms and monitoring, but failed to reach agreement on key issues like status of Donbas region, which Russia demands Ukraine cede, and security guarantees. President Zelenskyy 18 Feb accused Russia of dragging out negotiations and said it was “not fair” that U.S. President Trump was pressuring Kyiv, not Moscow, to make concessions. Separately, Kyiv and Moscow 27 Feb agreed to “local truce” near nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia region to allow for essential repairs.

Internal EU divisions stymied bloc’s support for Ukraine. Hungary and Slovakia 23 Feb vetoed fresh Russia sanctions package, while Budapest also threatened to block €90bn loan for Kyiv (agreed by EU leaders in Dec 2025), after halt of Russian oil flows through Druzhba pipeline, which Ukraine attributed to airstrikes; moves drew backlash from 25 other EU member states. Meanwhile, country’s backers 12 Feb reportedly committed some $38bn in defence aid.

In important domestic developments. Amid reports that Washington is pushing for elections as part of peace deal, Zelenskyy 14 Feb insisted vote could only be held two months after ceasefire. Meanwhile, authorities 16 Feb detained Zelenskyy’s former energy minister, Herman Halushchenko, and later charged him with money laundering and criminal group involvement, latest development in corruption scandal that has reached Zelenskyy’s inner circle.

President Mirziyoyev strengthened economic ties with Washington, while regional cooperation continued apace.

Mirziyoyev pushed for closer engagement with U.S. President Mirziyoyev 17 Feb arrived in U.S. capital Washington D.C. for inaugural summit of U.S. President Trump’s Board of Peace on 19 Feb. During visit, Mirziyoyev signed flurry of agreements designed to strengthen economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and U.S., including in critical minerals, energy and agricultural. Earlier, Tashkent participated in 4-5 Feb B5+1 forum hosted by Kyrgyzstan, which brought together officials and business leaders from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and U.S., as Washington expands its regional presence.

Regional countries discussed expanding cooperation with Afghanistan. Officials from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 16 Feb met in Kazakh capital Astana to discuss expansion of trade and connectivity with Taliban authorities in Afghanistan, as well as regional security concerns; during talks, Kazakh’s representative, Yerkin Tukumov, underscored importance of developing “common position”. Tashkent and Kabul next day signed trade agreements worth some $300mn, signalling countries’ deepening economic ties.

Talks between President Petro and U.S. President Trump helped ease months of bilateral tensions, the military increased pressure on the National Liberation Army (ELN), and political violence intensified ahead of the upcoming electoral cycle.

Petro-Trump meeting dialled down tensions. Following months of rhetorical disputes, Petro and Trump 3 Feb held talks in U.S. capital Washington D.C. Both described meeting as positive and reaffirmed cooperation on counter-narcotics, agreeing to prioritise capture of high-value targets: “Chiquito Malo” of Gaitanista Army (EGC), “Pablito” of ELN and alias Iván Mordisco of FARC dissident faction EMC. Petro also asked Trump to help mediate growing trade dispute with Quito (see Ecuador). Despite positive outcomes, relations remain fragile and could crack ahead of presidential elections in May.

Security operations following Petro-Trump meeting complicated peace talks. Following Petro-Trump détente, military 4 Feb launched airstrikes against ELN positions in Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander department, killing at least seven, including a minor; strikes occurred two days after ELN met with delegation from “International Community and the Colombian Episcopal Conference”, as well as govt envoy, to explore resumption of negotiations. Guerilla group 23 Feb announced unilateral ceasefire ahead of 8 March congressional elections. After reports that EGC leader was added to govt capture list, group 4 Feb suspended its participation in negotiations, though talks later resumed.

Fighting between armed groups caused disruption. Notably, Ombudsman 15 Feb reported that clashes between EGC and Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada had displaced dozens of families in Norte de Santander.

Political violence rose ahead of March congressional and May presidential polls. ELN combatants 5 Feb attacked security convoy of Senator Jairo Castellanos in Arauca department, while in Cauca department, armed assailants 10 Feb briefly kidnapped Senator Aída Quilcué Vivas and Morales mayor Óscar Guachetá Arrubla in separate incidents, 14 Feb detained congressional candidate Lucy Amparo Guzmán González. Campaign of prospective presidential contender Juan Carlos Pinzón Bueno 8 Feb reported burning of several billboards in El Zulia municipality, Norte de Santander, amid allegations ELN had prohibited campaigning in area. Two parliamentary candidates were reported missing 25–26 Feb in Cesar and Cauca departments, but were later freed.

The U.S. oil blockade brought Cuba to the brink of humanitarian collapse and fuelled fears that Washington could take more decisive action against the island in the coming weeks.

U.S. oil blockade gripped island. U.S.’ severing of Cuba’s access to imported oil led to electricity blackouts and severe fuel shortages. President Díaz-Canel 5 Feb announced temporary austerity measures, including fuel rationing, and said govt is “preparing in case we have to move to a state of war”. Authorities later announced that airlines would not be able to refuel in Cuba until 11 March, shortened work weeks, reduced school hours and cancelled cultural events. Govt 20 Feb said healthcare system is “in total collapse” as hospitals postponed routine procedures and struggled to maintain emergency and intensive care services; food insecurity also intensified. Amid mounting crisis, deputy FM Carlos de Cossío 4 Feb said Havana and Washington had established contact, and that Cuba was ready for “meaningful” dialogue. U.S. President Trump 16 Feb said sides were talking “right now” and called Cuba “failed nation” that “should absolutely make a deal”, 27 Feb said “maybe we’ll have a friendly takeover of Cuba”. Adding to tensions, Havana 25 Feb accused ten individuals on U.S.-registered boat carrying weapons of attempting to infiltrate Cuban territory with “terrorist intentions”. Border guards shot four people dead aboard boat after its occupants allegedly opened fire. U.S. Sec-State Marco Rubio claimed U.S. had no involvement in operation but was looking into “highly unusual” incident.

Govt looked to foreign allies for support. FM Bruno Rodríguez 4 Feb met with Chinese FM Wang Yi, who said Beijing “opposes unwarranted interference” and pledged support; Rodríguez 18 Feb also met Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov and Russian President Putin in Moscow, with latter calling blockade “unacceptable”. Mexico 12 Feb sent two ships with food and humanitarian aid; other countries also pledged aid and fuel support.  

Authorities sought to contain surging criminal violence with tough security measures, the national government temporarily relocated to the crime-hit port city of Guayaquil, and trade tensions with Colombia deepened.

Efforts to counter rampant criminal violence continued. In stark indicator of rising insecurity, a ranking published 11 Feb found six of ten most violent global cities in 2025 were in Ecuador, including Guayaquil, Babahoyo and Machala. Govt continued to expand security operations in response. Army 11 Feb reported destruction of camp belonging to Colombian armed group Frente Oliver Sinisterra in Imbabura province near Colombian border, area affected by illegal mining. Govt 15 Feb announced it had indefinitely assumed operational control of Segura EP, Guayaquil’s municipal security company, transferring its surveillance and logistics assets to authorities and further centralising public security management. President Noboa 28 Feb declared 30-day renewal of state of exception in nine provinces and three cantons. In important judicial development, judge 10 Feb ordered pre-trial detention of three members of Los Lobos criminal group accused of 2023 murder of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. Meanwhile, govt 24 Feb transferred 496 inmates from Litoral Penitentiary after official commission found tuberculosis outbreak, chronic malnutrition and other serious medical conditions in prison.

Govt relocated to Guayaquil after mayor’s arrest. Noboa 13 Feb announced govt would temporarily relocate to Guayaquil to oversee interventions in housing, education and security. Decision followed 10 Feb arrest of Aquiles Álvarez, city’s mayor and outspoken critic of Noboa, on alleged money laundering charges, which triggered local leadership crisis. Álvarez was transferred 12 Feb to Latacunga prison for pre-trial detention; his lawyers petitioned Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, alleging political persecution.

Trade dispute with Bogotá escalated. Quito 1 Feb imposed 30% “security tax” on Colombian imports, citing border security failures, leading Bogotá 24 Feb to impose reciprocal tariffs; Quito 26 Feb announced tariffs would rise to 50%.

Civil society criticism of the government’s tough security measures continued, particularly over prison conditions and mass trials.

Draconian security measures remained in place. Legislative Assembly 24 Feb renewed state of exception for 48th time. NGO Movement of Victims of the Regime 15 Feb held protests in capital San Salvador and other cities against mass trials of those detained under measure, arguing that collective prosecution risks sweeping up innocent civilians wrongfully arrested. Concerns about prison conditions also persisted; notably, NGO Socorro Jurídico Humanitario 23 Feb reported 11 deaths in prison since 1 Feb and 492 since March 2022 when state of exception was first introduced. VP Félix Ulloa 18 Feb defended security policy and claimed that reports of deaths in custody due to measure were “myth”; he also described mass trials as “innovative” and denied innocent civilians had been arrested. Meanwhile, President Bukele 15 Feb said navy had seized $165mn of cocaine in operation off south-western coast in largest ever drug seizure.

In an important international development. In sign of strong relations between U.S. and El Salvador, FM Alexandra Hill Tinoco 19 Feb attended first meeting of U.S. President Trump’s Board of Peace in U.S. capital Washington D.C.

The government replaced the State of Emergency with less restrictive measures, while tensions grew over upcoming elections for several key institutions.

State of Emergency, imposed mid-Jan following prison riots led by Barrio 18 gang and killing of ten police officers, managed to bring gang-related violence under control; police recaptured dozens of prisoners who escaped while army and police conducted joint patrols. After measure ended, President Arévalo 17 Feb announced State of Prevention for 30 days, allowing govt to restrict public gatherings and carrying of weapons but restoring constitutional rights. Meanwhile, elections in coming months to replace Attorney General, Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and Constitutional Court sparked political tensions; votes are widely seen as test of democratic institutions amid attempts by some in judiciary to block Arévalo’s anti-corruption agenda. Prosecutors from Attorney General’s office 12 Feb raided several polling stations for Constitutional Court vote, raising concerns that Attorney General and allies are seeking to influence process, while U.S. embassy 18 Feb said list of candidates for TSE includes individuals with links to organised crime and drug trafficking.

The Transitional Presidential Council's (TPC) mandate expired, paving the way for Prime Minister Fils-Aimé to become sole head of the executive; gangs remained relatively quiet during the transition.

Fils-Aimé established new political arrangement following dissolution of TPC. Prior to 7 Feb expiry of TPC’s mandate, U.S. 3 Feb deployed guided-missile destroyer and two coast guard vessels to bay off Port-au-Prince, next day made clear move was meant to dissuade efforts by some TPC members to remove Fils-Aimé and replace him with someone who would defend their interests. In absence of agreement on alternative governance schemes, TPC 7 Feb transferred power to Fils-Aimé, consolidating his position as sole head of govt despite most political groups favouring dual executive. PM 21 Feb proposed “National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections”, signed by influential political, social and economic groups in following days, which commits govt to creating conditions needed to hold elections in Aug. Agreement stipulates that new ministerial cabinet chaired by PM will remain in power until vote can take place, but sets no deadline for cabinet’s mandate should elections fail to take place according to established calendar. Opponents expressed concern about agreement’s lack of effective checks on Fils-Aimé’s authority and absence of clear time limit on his power.

Gangs remained comparatively subdued during transition. Gangs, which have escalated attacks during political turmoil in the past, did not launch major offensives or issue public threats in Feb, indicating they are on defensive amid stepped-up security operations by Haitian police and foreign contractors. Notably, police 21 Feb said overnight operation in mountainous area of Kenscoff, which overlooks capital, killed at least 16 suspected gang members. Earlier, authorities 7 Feb reopened Carrefour Aéroport police station, abandoned since March 2024 following gang attacks, and vendors began returning to surrounding area. Meanwhile, recent reports suggested increase in kidnappings for ransom in Port-au-Prince, especially Delmas area.

Child recruitment by armed groups drew renewed concern. UNICEF 12 Feb said recruitment of minors by armed groups increased by 200% in 2025. Agency representative in Haiti 13 Feb said dialogue with Viv Ansanm to secure release of children should not be ruled out.

The military killed El Mencho, head of the powerful Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), setting off a violent cartel uprising that engulfed numerous states and renewed concerns about the risks of targeting kingpins.

Killing of CJNG chief unleashed violent response. Mexican troops 22 Feb killed Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho”, head of powerful CJNG in Tapalpa town, Jalisco state, in operation planned with U.S. intelligence support. News triggered violent cartel retaliation, which began in Jalisco but quickly spread across country, as operatives set cars, buses and business alight, blocked roads with burning vehicles, and clashed with security forces, illustrating CJNG’s territorial reach and capacity to orchestrate coordinated attacks. In Jalisco’s Puerto Vallarta city, 23 inmates managed to escape prison. Together, operation and its aftermath left scores dead, including one civilian. Violence may escalate in future as targeting kingpins, while delivering win for President Sheinbaum and Washington, creates incentives for intra- and inter-cartel violence.

Sinaloa turf war showed no sign of letting up. Violence continued in Sinaloa state between rival Sinaloa cartel factions, bringing total number of deaths to 2,884 since fighting broke out in Sept 2024 and number of disappearances to 3,337, as of 27 Feb. Troops 5 Feb uncovered site with at least six mass graves and 14 bodies, five identified as mine workers kidnapped in late Jan from company compound in Sinaloa’s mineral-rich Concordia region, which is hotly contested by cartel’s warring factions, as well as smaller armed groups.

Authorities tackled official corruption. Authorities 5 Feb arrested mayor of Tequila municipality, Diego Rivera, for alleged kidnapping, organised crime and extortion of major tequila producers in collusion with CJNG. Mexico 17 Feb requested U.S. formally arrest and extradite former Tamaulipas governor, Francisco Cabeza de Vaca, to face criminal charges; Washington did not respond publicly.

Mexico intensified naval interdictions. Navy 11 Feb intercepted 188 cocaine packages off Manzanillo city, Colima state, 19 Feb seized seven tonnes of cocaine aboard two semi-submersibles, under agreement with U.S. aimed at preventing strikes on alleged drug vessels near Mexican waters.

Regime repression continued, while Managua strengthened ties with Beijing amid its ever-worsening relations with Washington.

Regime crackdown continued. Inter-American Human Rights Commission 10 Feb reported that at least four of eight detained Mayangna Indigenous forest rangers – held as political prisoners – are being kept in deplorable conditions. NGO Mechanism for Recognition of Political Prisoners 26 Feb reported that at least 46 individuals remain detained for political reasons, including former Sandinista revolution figures and ex-govt collaborators. Meanwhile, authorities 13 Feb detained and deported cleric José Concepción Reyes Mairena to Spain, highlighting regime’s continued pressure on Catholic church.

In important international developments. U.S. court 9 Feb ruled that Department of Homeland Security can end Temporary Protection Status for some 3,000 Nicaraguan immigrants. U.S. 18 Feb sanctioned director of Nicaragua’s largest prison for involvement in human rights violations against political detainees; 26 Feb imposed sanctions on five senior officials, accusing them of inciting “regional instability” by enabling regime’s consolidation of power. As relations with Washington suffered, Ministry of Energy and Mines 9 Feb granted almost 40,000 hectares of land to Chinese companies, latest in series of mining concessions. 

The much-touted amnesty reform fell well short of expectations, underscoring the limited and uncertain progress toward a political transition, while Caracas cooperated with U.S. demands on oil sector reform.

Amnesty law faced criticism. Prisoner releases that began in Jan continued through mid-Feb. Among them was Juan Pablo Guanipa, senior leader of Primero Justicia party and close ally of opposition leader María Corina Machado. Authorities 9 Feb accused him of violating conditions of his release, however, and briefly re-arrested him. Incident was widely interpreted as warning against open dissent. Legislature 19 Feb approved amnesty law introduced in Jan, but human rights advocates expressed reservations about bill’s provisions, underscoring limited and uncertain progress on political transition. Among criticisms included fact that: potential beneficiaries would have to apply for amnesty via same courts that imprisoned them; bill limits application to specific sets of events, leaving thousands who have suffered persecution unable to benefit; there are no reparations. President of special parliamentary commission, Jorge Arreaza, 27 Feb announced that 4,757 people had benefited from amnesty, which included 223 prisoner releases. NGO Foro Penal day prior said 568 political prisoners remain behind bars.

U.S. appeared to sideline Machado further. Machado 2 Feb said she would meet Rodríguez “if necessary” to organise political transition and 5 Feb told news outlet Politico that, once process begins, elections could be held within ten months. U.S. President Trump 24 Feb did not refer to Machado when speaking of Venezuela at State of the Union address, but did fly in former presidential candidate and political prisoner Enrique Márquez, leading to speculation about whether Washington is switching its support to moderate wing of opposition.

U.S. remained focused on oil sector reform. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright 12 Feb became first senior U.S. official in decades to visit Venezuela, holding talks with interim President Rodríguez and touring oil facilities; trip followed late-Jan passage of hydrocarbons law reform, which opens energy sector to foreign and especially U.S. capital. Wright said U.S. had brokered $1bn in oil sales and expected further $5bn in coming months. Washington next day eased some sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry.

The country normalised diplomatic relations with Niger as part of a broader effort to repair ties with Sahelian states; tensions with Morocco remained high despite the first direct talks on Western Sahara in years.

Algeria redoubled efforts to mend ties with Sahel countries. Nigerien president, Gen. Abdourahmane Tiani, 15-16 Feb visited Algeria and met with President Tebboune; leaders announced normalisation of bilateral relations, with both countries returning their respective ambassadors after ten-month hiatus, and Tebboune said construction of Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline would begin in Niger after Ramadan (see Niger). It remains unclear whether rapprochement could serve as springboard for thaw in relations between Algeria and Mali, which have also been at low ebb since April 2025. Earlier, high-level govt delegation 12-13 Feb visited Burkina Faso to discuss cooperation in energy and hydrocarbon sectors.

Tensions with France appeared to ease. During visit to Algeria, French Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez 17 Feb met with Tebboune; leaders agreed to reinvigorate “very high-level security cooperation”, notably to facilitate return of Algerian nationals living illegally in France. Nuñez also discussed counter-terrorism cooperation, particularly in Sahel region, with his counterpart Saïd Sayoud. Trip marks first visit to Algeria by French minister since April 2025, signalling potential thaw in bilateral relations.

Tensions with Morocco remained high despite first direct talks on Western Sahara in years. Algeria 8-9 Feb participated in first direct, multilateral talks with Morocco on Western Sahara since 2019 (see Western Sahara). Tebboune 1 Feb inaugurated railway line linking Gara Djebilet iron ore mine to Tindouf and Béchar cities over 950km distance, with ultimate goal of connecting mine to Oran city over 1,500km and ramping up mineral extraction. Announcement sparked criticism in Morocco, with public figures arguing deposit is located on Moroccan territory or insisting extraction cannot proceed without Morocco’s consent, citing bilateral agreement dating back to 1972.

Israel reopened the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip after a two-year closure, and a media investigation revealed that Cairo had carried out drone strikes against Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Sisi reshuffled govt, appointed new defence minister. House of Representatives 10 Feb approved cabinet reshuffle proposed by President Sisi, bringing 13 new ministers into govt; most changes affected economic and administrative portfolios. Sisi next day also announced appointment of new defence minister, Gen. Ashraf Salem Zaher Mansour, who was previously head of Military Academy; appointment is part of Sisi’s frequent rotation of top military officers to coup-proof his regime.

Rafah border crossing with Gaza Strip reopened. Israel 2 Feb officially reopened Rafah border crossing with Sinai Peninsula, allowing Palestinians to leave and re-enter Gaza. Ahead of reopening, Israel gave in to Egypt’s objections and withdrew condition that number of people entering Gaza could not exceed those leaving, which would have effectively prevented return of Palestinian exiles. Meanwhile, Cairo remained engaged in Gaza diplomacy. Notably, FM Badr Abdelatty 6 Feb again urged full implementation of second phase of Gaza ceasefire.

Egypt reportedly launched drone strikes against RSF. Reuters and The New York Times 3 and 5 Feb reported that Egypt carried out airstrikes against Sudan’s RSF using Bayraktar Akinci drones stationed at East Oweinat airbase near shared border, citing satellite imagery and interviews with anonymous security officers. Drone attacks reportedly began after fall of El Fasher in Darfur in Oct 2025.

In other important developments. Sisi 8 Feb met with his Somali counterpart, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, in Cairo, reiterated support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, condemned Israel’s Dec 2025 recognition of Somaliland, and confirmed Egypt would soon deploy troop to Somalia as part of AU mission (AUSSOM). Sisi 28 Feb held emergency calls with several Arab state leaders to express Egypt’s solidarity after Tehran launched missile attacks on their territories in response to U.S.-Israeli military operation in Iran, warned that escalation threatened “regional chaos” (see Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen).

After Tehran and Washington held three rounds of negotiations, Israel and the U.S. launched an all-out war on Iran, prompting Tehran to retaliate with unprecedented attacks across the region.

U.S. during Feb amassed huge military forces in region, including deploying second aircraft carrier group, while Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 16 Feb held drill dubbed “Smart Control of the Hormuz Strait”. Highlighting sky-high tensions, U.S. Central Command 3 Feb reported that its fighter jet downed Iranian drone that had “aggressively approached” USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier; hours later, Iranian drones and vessels sought to seize U.S.-flagged tanker, prompting U.S. forces to intervene before vessel continued route. In first negotiations since 12-day war in June 2025, U.S. and Iranian representatives 6 Feb convened in Oman’s capital Muscat; Oman’s FM said discussions clarified positions and identified areas for possible progress. After meeting Israeli PM Netanyahu, U.S. President Trump 11 Feb stated negotiations would continue but that nothing definitive had been reached. Netanyahu 15 Feb demanded removal of enriched material, zero enrichment capability, missile constraints and dismantling of regional proxies. U.S. and Iranian delegations 17 Feb reconvened in Geneva, Switzerland; U.S. officials acknowledged movement but stressed unresolved “red lines”. Trump 19 Feb warned that absent a “meaningful deal”, “bad things happen”, giving Iran 10-15 days to reach agreement. Parties 26 Feb met for third round of talks in Geneva, with Omani mediators reporting “significant progress” and plans for technical talks. However, Israel and U.S. 28 Feb launched all-out war, striking military targets and killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, dozens of senior officials as well as hundreds of Iranians. Iran launched unprecedented retaliatory drone and missile strikes against range of targets, including in Bahrain, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, while Iran’s allies Hizbollah and Iraqi militias conducted operations to support Tehran (see Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen).

Israel and the U.S. launched an all-out war on Iran, sparking fierce Iranian retaliation that quickly spread to Iraq; earlier, the government formation process faced major hurdles.

Israel-U.S. war on Iran reverberated in Iraq. After Israel and U.S. 28 Feb launched devastating war on Iran, Tehran same day retaliated fiercely across region, including firing missiles and drones on U.S. base in Erbil city in Kurdistan region. Suspected Israeli airstrikes targeted weapon depots of Iraqi resistance groups in Jurf al-Sakhr town, south of capital Baghdad, killing two militants. Resistance groups vowed to target U.S. bases in Iraq and region, as hostilities rapidly spread (see Israel/Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen).

Govt formation faced further delays. After Shiite Coordination Framework nominated former PM Nuri al-Maliki to premiership late Jan, which sparked political crisis as U.S. President Trump intervened with scathing rebuke of Maliki, pressure on framework parties to rescind nomination grew during Feb. Iraqi media reported U.S. had threatened sanctions unless framework finds alternative nominee. Maliki 23 Feb stated he had “no intention” of withdrawing from race. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack 27 Feb met Maliki, reportedly to convince him to withdraw. Meanwhile, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) remained deadlocked over both nomination of federal president, who by convention should be Kurdish, and formation of regional govt (stalled since Oct 2024). KDP leader Masoud Barzani and PUK leader Bafel Talabani 11 Feb met in regional capital Erbil, both describing meeting as positive despite no agreement.

Iraq received thousands of ISIS detainees from Syria. U.S. 12 Feb completed three-week mission transferring over 5,700 suspected ISIS-affiliated detainees from north-eastern Syria to Iraqi custody, amid reports of mass breakouts (see Syria). FM Fuad Hussein 23 Feb stated govt had reached agreement with Türkiye to return Turkish nationals among detainees.

Maritime dispute resurfaced with Kuwait. Govt 21 Feb revealed it had submitted to UN updated coordinates and maps related to long-running dispute with Kuwait over Khor Abdullah, narrow waterway that empties into Gulf. Kuwait same day summoned Iraq’s chargé d’affaires to protest submission. Iraq and Kuwait ratified agreement to end dispute in 2013, but Iraq’s Supreme Court in 2023 ruled ratification was invalid.

Israel and the U.S. launched an all-out war on Iran, prompting fierce Iranian retaliation; meanwhile, the Gaza ceasefire remained fragile and Israel accelerated its annexation of the West Bank as it locked down both territories.

Israel and U.S. launched new war on Iran. Israel and U.S. 28 Feb jointly attacked hundreds of sites across Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of top commanders (see Iran). Iran launched waves of missile counterstrikes at Israel, largely blunted by Israeli and U.S. interceptors but causing at least nine fatalities and countrywide disruption. After Iran’s ally Hizbollah 2 March launched rocket barrage at Israel in support of Tehran, Israel heavily bombarded Lebanon and announced ground operations (see Lebanon).

Gaza truce held, Israel reimposed full siege during fighting with Iran. Israel continued deadly attacks in Gaza, killing over 630 Palestinians since truce came into effect on 10 Oct 2025. Living conditions for 2mn Palestinians remained appalling; during war with Iran, Israel completely sealed off the strip. Earlier, U.S. President Trump 19 Feb hosted first meeting of Board of Peace member states, who pledged billions of dollars in aid for Gaza. Yet 14-person council of Palestinian technocrats to run Gaza, appointed by board, was blocked from visiting strip.

Israel tightened its grip on West Bank. Israel took several steps that demonstrated redundancy of Oslo Accords. Israel 3 Feb announced expansion of Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries in bid to create seamless corridor for Jews into West Bank. Israeli cabinet 8 Feb streamlined Jewish purchase of land without govt oversight, permitting Israeli authorities to demolish Palestinian buildings in Areas A and B (40% of West Bank, under Palestinian Authority’s control) using various pretexts. Cabinet also assumed authority over construction in Hebron city, unilaterally annulling 1997 agreement with Palestinian Authority. Israel 15 Feb began process of registering land across territory, likely to declare large chunks “state land” to dispossess Palestinians of up to 83% of Area C (around 50% of West Bank). Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich 8 Feb declared “We will continue to kill the idea of a Palestinian state” and 17 Feb asserted his goal to encourage Palestinian emigration. Meanwhile, Israeli settlers 18 Feb shot dead 19-year-old Palestinian-American in Makhmas village near Ramallah. Citing Iran war, Israel 1 March closed hundreds of barriers that dot West Bank, locking down 3mn Palestinians.

Israel and the U.S. launched an all-out war on Iran, prompting Hizbollah to enter the fray with cross-border attacks; Israel heavily bombarded Lebanon, as the Lebanese government instructed the army to expedite its disarmament plan.

Israel launched massive escalation after Hizbollah’s attacks. Early on 2 March, Hizbollah launched missiles and drones toward Israel for first time in well over a year, despite Israel’s near-daily violations of Israel-Lebanon ceasefire struck in Nov 2024. Hizbollah justified its operation as retaliation for assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, part of the Israel-U.S. all-out war on Iran launched 28 Feb (see Iran). Israel responded with severe airstrikes in southern Lebanon, eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs, killing scores and displacing tens of thousands. Israel early March warned that it would further intensify military operations in Lebanon in coming weeks and announced ground incursions, after having reportedly warned Hizbollah not to enter conflict on Iran’s side.

After escalation, govt told army to expedite its disarmament plan. Army commander Rodolph Haykal 16 Feb set out military’s vision for second stage of disarmament process – after first phase focusing on area between Litani River and Israeli border – that will entail clearing unauthorised weapons between Litani and Awali Rivers; Haykal estimated army would require 4-8 months to complete second phase. Hizbollah chief Naim Qassem same day cautioned that Lebanese state should “give up on the weapons monopoly”; Hizbollah insists Nov 2024 ceasefire deal applies only south of Litani River, and it will only consider disarming further north if Israel ends its attacks and withdraws from occupied points in south. Following Hizbollah’s attack on Israel, Lebanese govt 2 March outlawed Hizbollah’s military activities and instructed army to fast-track disarmament plan “by all means necessary”; if army confronts Hizbollah with force (which it has avoided doing until now), it could spark dangerous escalation.

Public protests erupted over tax increases. International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation mid-Feb visited capital Beirut to discuss govt’s financial reform efforts. Key legislation allocating losses from banking sector’s collapse, which is required for unlocking IMF financial assistance, remained stalled in parliament. Amid public pressure over devalued salaries, govt 16 Feb increased fuel excise taxes and VAT to fund higher wages for state employees, which triggered protests in Beirut and other cities.

Unidentified gunmen killed former strongman Muammar Qadhafi’s son; the country awarded new oil and gas blocks to seven companies in its first licensing round since 2007.

Sporadic violence persisted in various regions. Unidentified gunmen 3 Feb shot and killed only son of late strongman Muammar Qadhafi still living in Libya, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, at his home in western town of Zintan; no group claimed responsibility. Authorities in following days launched investigation. Some of Saif al-Islam’s associates blamed potential political rivals, noting that his broad popular support could have made him strong contender in nationwide elections. Meanwhile, clashes 24-25 Feb reportedly erupted between forces loyal to eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and armed group known as Operations Room for the Liberation of Southern Libya along south-western border with Niger, and drone 27 Feb reportedly struck LNA convoy travelling from Sirte city toward Niger border, killing several soldiers; fighting, reportedly linked to struggle for control of cross-border smuggling routes, left at least two dead.

Fractures within judiciary continued to deepen. Rivalry between newly created eastern-backed Supreme Constitutional Court and Tripoli-based Supreme Court continued to intensify, with courts from Jan onward issuing series of competing decisions; tit-for-tat underscores rival authorities’ use of legal disputes to undercut one another. In her briefing to Security Council, UN envoy Hanna Tetteh 18 Feb said rivalry risks fracturing country’s judiciary, the one national institution that has remained largely unified thus far, and is already fuelling legal anarchy in country.

Economic picture remained mixed. After Central Bank in Jan devalued Libyan dinar by 14.7%, Libyans reported sharp increases in living costs and significant erosion of their purchasing power. Despite deteriorating economic conditions and chaos in banking sector, foreign investors continued to express confidence in Libya, especially its oil sector. National Oil Corporation 11 Feb announced results of its first major oil and gas exploration licensing round in nearly two decades, awarding five new exploration blocks – out of 22-block tender – to international oil companies.

Israel and the U.S. launched an all-out war on Iran, prompting fierce Iranian retaliation against all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

Israel-U.S. war on Iran triggered unprecedented regional fallout. Qatar and Oman in Feb led regional mediation efforts between U.S. and Iran to find diplomatic off-ramp to avoid new war, amid massive U.S. military build-up in region. Despite such efforts and three rounds of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, Israel and U.S. 28 Feb launched devastating attacks on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, dozens of senior officials as well as hundreds of Iranians (see Iran). Iran began unprecedented retaliatory drone and missile strikes against broad range of targets, including in GCC countries Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Israel, Iraq and Jordan, while Iran’s allies Hizbollah and Iraqi militias launched military attacks to support Tehran (see Israel/Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen).

Earlier, Riyadh and UAE pursued conflicting policies in Yemen and Africa. Before outbreak of war, breakdown of relations between Saudi Arabia and UAE due to their competing strategic visions for surrounding regions continued to play out in Yemen and Sudan, and deepen existing rival alliances across Horn of Africa. Notably, Yemen’s internationally-recognised govt 6 Feb announced new cabinet following pushback against southern separatists in Dec-Jan, shoring up Saudi Arabia’s role as primary external actor shaping political dynamics in Yemen (see Yemen). Saudi Arabia’s FM Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud 12 Feb visited Ethiopia; Riyadh likely sought to nudge country toward neutral stance on Sudan’s war amid reports of UAE base in Ethiopia supporting Rapid Support Forces in Sudan (see Sudan and Ethiopia). Saudi vice minister next day visited Eritrea in attempt to prevent potential military conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia (see Eritrea).

Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) implemented January’s integration deal; thousands fled the largest camp housing family members of alleged Islamic State (ISIS) members in the north east, fuelling fears of the group’s resurgence.

Govt and SDF abided by Jan deal, but challenges remained. Implementation of initial steps in Damascus-SDF deal agreed late Jan proceeded smoothly. Notably, govt personnel entered Al-Hasakah city 2 Feb, Qamishli city 3 Feb, Qamishli airport 22 Feb and Kobane 27 Feb; this marks beginning of integration process, although SDF forces thus far still retain overall control of most neighbourhoods, local administration and border crossings. Underscoring positive atmosphere in contrast to Jan, FM Asaad Shaibani and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi 13 Feb met U.S. Sec State Marco Rubio, with Abdi describing meeting as “very productive”. Challenges remained, however: sides possessed different interpretations of precise terms of SDF’s integration into state and U.S. military withdrawal could leave security vacuums.

Thousands of ISIS-linked detainees exited Al-Hol detention camp. After SDF late Jan withdrew from Al-Hol – Syria’s largest detention facility for relatives of suspected ISIS members, previously housing over 20,000 people – brief security vacuum ensued before govt forces took control. Reports suggested majority of population escaped camp through various means, with presumably thousands spreading out across Syria and making way to neighbouring countries, raising concerns about resurging violent extremism. U.S. 3 and 12 Feb conducted airstrikes on over 30 ISIS targets, and 12 Feb completed mission to transfer over 5,700 ISIS-affiliated males to Iraq (see Iraq). ISIS 21 Feb denounced Syrian govt, criticising its alignment with U.S. and Türkiye, “declaring war” against its forces; ISIS late Feb reportedly killed ten members of govt forces.

U.S. accelerated its military drawdown. U.S. 11 Feb completed its withdrawal from al-Tanf garrison near Syria-Jordan-Iraq tri-border established in 2016, and 15 Feb handed its main hub at al-Shaddadi to Syrian army. U.S. officials 18 Feb reportedly stated withdrawal of remaining 1,000 troops is expected in next two months.

Israel-U.S. war on Iran caused minimal impact in Syria, thus far. After Israel and U.S. 28 Feb launched all-out war on Iran, sparking fierce Iranian retaliation across Middle East, debris falling from Iranian missiles and drones intercepted above Syria injured at least six (see Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen).

The judicial crackdown on dissent continued unabated, with several political and civil society figures sentenced to prison.

Courts handed down multiple rulings targeting critics of President Saïed. Tunis Court of Appeal 2 Feb sentenced former speaker of parliament, Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party President Rached Ghannouchi – who has been imprisoned since 2023, to 20 years in prison, up from 14 years in first instance, for conspiracy against state security and forming terrorist group; six other individuals received prison sentences ranging from three to 20 years. Security forces 15 Feb arrested U.S.-based Olfa Hamdi, who was briefly CEO of national airline Tunisair in 2021, at Tunis airport after she called for transitional government and early elections in social media posts while in exile in U.S. Meanwhile, Tunis court 17 Feb sentenced civil society activist Imed Dghij to two years in prison on terrorism-related charges, and 19 Feb sentenced MP Ahmed Saidani to eight months in prison for social media posts that were considered offensive to Saïed.

Tensions remained high over pollution crisis in south. In emergency ruling, court in southern city of Gabès 26 Feb rejected urgent request by Gabès bar association to suspend operations at local fertiliser plant, citing lack of “sufficient proof of harm”, after thousands of protesters in Oct 2025 blamed facility for range of health conditions among local residents; final verdict still pending. Earlier, court 19 Feb had sentenced 12 members of local campaign group Stop Pollution to one year in prison in absentia over 2020 protest at plant. 

U.S.-led talks brought together key stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict for the first time since 2019, creating a narrow window for diplomatic progress.

Diplomacy gained momentum with talks between key stakeholders. Ministerial delegations from Polisario Front independence movement, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco 8-9 Feb held direct talks, for first time since 2019, at U.S. embassy in Madrid. Morocco tabled revised 40-page autonomy plan, replacing its brief 2007 proposal, to serve as refined basis for negotiations. While UN formally co-hosted talks, U.S. assumed leading mediating role, reflecting Washington’s intent to intensify pressure and accelerate progress. Format was also unprecedented: Algeria and Mauritania participated as full parties rather than “regional observers”, despite previously rejecting Morocco’s claim that they were direct stakeholders to Western Sahara conflict. Meeting signalled renewed momentum for diplomacy, though referendum remains stumbling block as Algeria and Polisario insist that Sahrawis’ “right to self-determination” inherently includes independence option, while Morocco maintains that autonomy satisfies self-determination.

In other important developments. U.S. bill aiming to designate Polisario Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), which was introduced in House of Representatives in mid-2025, continued to slowly gain traction with sixth and seventh endorsements on 13, 24 Feb. U.S. Senator Ted Cruz 3 Feb announced intention to table similar FTO designation bill in Senate if Polisario does not cease “terrorist activity”, citing group’s alleged links with Iran.

Israel and the U.S. launched an all-out war on Iran, which the Houthis may enter in defence of Tehran despite initial restraint; earlier, deadly clashes erupted in Yemen’s south between government forces and separatists.

Israel-U.S. war against Iran may trigger Houthis to enter the fray. Amid massive U.S. military build-up in region during Feb, Houthis stepped up harsh rhetoric against U.S. and Israel, warning of “inevitable upcoming confrontation” and broad military response. After Israel and U.S. 28 Feb launched devastating attacks on Iran, sparking fierce Iranian retaliation across region, Houthis appeared to proceed cautiously and not rush to Iran’s defence; but fearing Islamic Republic of Iran’s demise, Houthis may step in by potentially resuming Red Sea maritime attacks or launching cross-border strikes targeting Israel or Gulf states (see Israel/Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia).

Govt formed new cabinet, seeking to rein in various factions. Internationally-recognised govt 6 Feb announced 35-member cabinet following weeks of consultations led by PM-designate Shaya al-Zindani; unusually large number of ministers reflected need for political containment following military pushback of Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) territorial gains in Dec-Jan. New cabinet faces immediate tests, including tackling major economic challenges and restoring credibility by preventing ministers from operating as factional representatives; new dispensation also certifies Saudi Arabia as key external power broker in Yemen.

In Shabwa and Aden, clashes between STC supporters and govt forces turned deadly. Governor of Shabwa province 10 Feb announced closure of STC offices and seizure of their assets. Armed clashes next erupted in Ataq city between security forces and STC-linked protestors as latter marched toward governorate headquarters, killing at least five and wounding over 30; STC accused govt of firing on unarmed demonstrators. In Aden city, hours after new cabinet’s first meeting on 17 Feb, dozens of protestors linked to STC gathered outside presidential palace as some reportedly breached gates; in response, security forced opened fire, killing at least one and injuring around 20. Govt accused armed STC elements of stoking unrest with possible external support, referring to United Arab Emirates, while STC condemned excessive force. Govt subsequently deployed Saudi-backed Nation Shield Forces in new areas in Aden, aiming to prevent potential STC attacks. Tensions between STC remnants and govt could escalate further in coming weeks.